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ON THE MATHEMATICAL AND FOUNDATIONAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCOUNTABLE
DAG NORMANN AND SAM SANDERS
Abstract. We study the logical and computational properties of basic theo-
rems of uncountable mathematics, including the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemma
published in 1895 and 1903. Historically, these lemmas were among the first
formulations of open-cover compactness and the Lindelo¨f property, respec-
tively. These notions are of great conceptual importance: the former is com-
monly viewed as a way of treating uncountable sets like e.g. [0, 1] as ‘almost
finite’, while the latter allows one to treat uncountable sets like e.g. R as ‘almost
countable’. This reduction of the uncountable to the finite/countable turns out
to have a considerable logical and computational cost: we show that the afore-
mentioned lemmas, and many related theorems, are extremely hard to prove,
while the associated sub-covers are extremely hard to compute. Indeed, in
terms of the standard scale (based on comprehension axioms), a proof of these
lemmas requires at least the full extent of second-order arithmetic, a system
originating from Hilbert-Bernays’ Grundlagen der Mathematik. This obser-
vation has far-reaching implications for the Grundlagen’s spiritual successor,
the program of Reverse Mathematics, and the associated Go¨del hierachy. We
also show that the Cousin lemma is essential for the development of the gauge
integral, a generalisation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals that
also uniquely provides a direct formalisation of Feynman’s path integral.
The content of this paper extends [70] in that Sections 3.3.4 and 3.4 below are
new. Small corrections/additions have also been made to reflect new developments.
1. Introduction
1.1. Infinity: hubris and catharsis. It is a commonplace that finite and count-
able sets exhibit many useful properties that uncountable sets lack. Conveniently,
there are properties that allow one to treat uncountable sets as though they were
finite or countable, namely open-cover compactness and the Lindelo¨f property, i.e.
the statement that an open cover has a finite, respectively countable, sub-cover.
These notions are well-established: the Cousin lemma ([15, p. 22]) on the open-
cover compactness of subsets of R2, dates back1 135 years, while the Lindelo¨f lemma
([50, p. 698]) on the Lindelo¨f property of Rn, dates back about 115 years. Despite
their basic nature, their central role in analysis, and a long history, little is known
about the logical and computational properties of the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas.
In a nutshell, we aim to fill this hole in the literature in this paper. We discuss our
motivations and goals in detail in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively.
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1The collected works of Pincherle contain a footnote by the editors (See [72, p. 67]) which
states that the associated Teorema (published in 1882) corresponds to the Heine-Borel theorem.
Moreover, Weierstrass proves the Heine-Borel theorem (without explicitly formulating it) in 1880
in [101, p. 204]. A detailed motivation for these claims may be found in [52, p. 96-97].
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As it tuns out, the hubris of reducing the uncountable to the finite/countable as
in the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas, comes at great logical and computational cost.
Indeed, we establish below that these lemmas are extremely hard to prove, while
the sub-covers from these lemmas are similarly hard to compute. Now, ‘hardness
of proof’ is measured by what comprehension2 axioms are necessary to prove the
theorem. In this sense, a proof of the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas requires (com-
prehension axioms as strong as) second-order arithmetic, as is clear from Figure 1,
where the latter originates from Hilbert-Bernays’ Grundlagen der Mathematik [36].
Moreover, the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas are not isolated events: we provide
a list of basic theorems (See Section 1.3) with the same ‘extreme’ logical and com-
putational properties. Some of the listed theorems are even of great conceptual
importance as they pertain to the gauge integral ([6]), which provides a general-
isation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integrals, and (to the best of our
knowledge) the only direct formalisation of the Feynman path integral ([13,59,60]).
By way of catharsis, our results call into question various empirical claims from
the foundation of mathematics, such as the ‘Big Five’ classification from Reverse
Mathematics (See Section 2.1) and the linear nature of the Go¨del hierarchy (See
Section 2.2). Nonetheless, we obtain in Section 3.3 Reverse Mathematics style
equivalences involving the Cousin lemma and basic properties of the gauge integral.
Finally, Reverse Mathematics is intimately connected to classical computability
theory (See e.g. [91, II.7.5]); similarly, our results have an (almost) equivalent refor-
mulation in higher-order computability theory, and are even (often) obtained via
the latter. Furthermore, in light of this correspondence, we investigate in Section 4.1
the strength of the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas when combined with fundamental
objects from computability theory. This study yields surprising results reaching all
the way up to Gandy’s superjump ([30]), a ‘higher-order’ version of Turing’s Halting
problem ([97]), the prototypical non-computable object.
1.2. Foundational and mathematical motivations. We discuss the motiva-
tions for this paper. Items (i) and (ii) motivate the study of mathematics beyond
the language of second-order arithmetic L2, the framework for ‘classical’ Reverse
Mathematics, while a notable consequence is provided by item (iii).
(i) The gauge integral is a generalisation of the Lebesgue and (improper) Rie-
mann integral, and formalises Feynman’s path integral (See Section 1.2.1).
The language L2 cannot accommodate (basic) gauge integration.
(ii) The foundational studies of mathematics led by Hilbert take place in a
logical framework richer than the language L2 (See Section 1.2.2). It is
natural to ask if anything is lost by restricting to L2.
(iii) The compatibility problem for Nelson’s predicative arithmetic ([67]) was
solved in the negative ([14]). We solve the compatibility problem for Weyl-
Feferman predicative mathematics in the negative (See Section 1.2.3).
As an example of how items (i) and (ii) are intimately related: the uniqueness of
the gauge integral requires (Heine-Borel) compactness for uncountable covers. The
latter compactness cannot be formulated in L2, and will be seen to have completely
different logical and computational properties compared to the ‘countable/second-
order’ substitute, i.e. (Heine-Borel) compactness for countable covers.
2Intuitively speaking, a comprehension axiom states that the set {x ∈ X : ϕ(x)} exists for all
formulas ϕ in a certain class, and with the variable x in the domain X.
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1.2.1. Mathematical motivations. In this section, we discuss the mathematical mo-
tivations for this paper, provided by the study of the gauge integral. As will be-
come clear, the latter cannot be (directly) formulated in the language of second-
order arithmetic, yielding a measure of motivation for our adoption of Kohlenbach’s
higher-order framework involving all finite types.
First of all, the gauge integral (aka Henstock-Kurzweil integral) was introduced
around 1912 by Denjoy (in a different form) and constitutes a simultaneous gen-
eralisation of the Lebesgue and improper Riemann integral. The gauge integral
provides (to the best of our knowledge) the only formal framework close to the
original development of the Feynman path integral ([13,59,60]), i.e. gauge integrals
are highly relevant in (the foundations of) physics. As expected, the gauge integral
can handle discontinuous functions, which were around at the time: Dirichlet dis-
cusses the characteristic function of Q around 1829 in [17], while Riemann defines
a function with countably many discontinuities in his Habilitationsschrift [44].
Secondly, since Lebesgue integration is studied in Reverse Mathematics (See
[91, X.1]), it is a natural next step to study the gauge integral. However, this
study cannot take place in the language of second-order arithmetic for the following
reasons: on one hand (general) discontinuous functions are essential for proving
basic results of the gauge integral by Remark 3.21 and Corollary 3.24. On the
other hand, by Theorem 3.20, the uniqueness of the gauge integral requires the
Cousin lemma ([15, p. 22]), which deals with uncountable covers, and the latter
cannot be formulated in the language of second-order arithmetic.
In conclusion, the gauge integral seems to require a logical framework richer than
second-order arithmetic. Now, this richer framework yields surprising results: the
Cousin lemma expresses compactness for uncountable open covers; this lemma turns
out to have completely different logical and computational properties compared to
compactness restricted to countable covers as in Reverse Mathematics ([91, IV.1]).
1.2.2. Foundational motivations. We show that the foundational studies of math-
ematics led by Hilbert took place in a framework richer than second-order arith-
metic. First of all, in his 1917-1933 lectures on the foundations of mathemat-
ics ([37]), Hilbert used a logical system involving third-order3 Funktionfunktionen.
Ackermann’s 1924 dissertation (supervised by Hilbert) starts with an overview of
Hilbertsche Beweistheorie, i.e. Hilbertian proof theory, which explicitly includes
third-order3 parameters and the ‘epsilon’ operator.
Secondly, Hilbert and Bernays introduce4 the formal system H in [36, Supple-
ment IV], and use it to formalise parts of mathematics, again based on the ‘epsilon’
operator. Now, Hilbert and Bernays in [36, p. 495] use the epsilon operator to de-
fine a certain object ξ which maps functions to functions, i.e. a third-order object.
Similarly, Feferman’s ‘µ’ operator (See Section 2.4) is defined with the same name
in [36, p. 476], while the ‘ν’ operator from [36, p. 479] is only a slight variation
of the Suslin functional (See Section 2.4). Hence, one could develop large parts of
Kohlenbach’s higher-order Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2.3.2) in H .
3In the notation of this paper, to be introduced in Section 2.3.2, n+1-th order objects (n ≥ 0)
correspond to objects of type n.
4All other systems in [36, Suppl. IV] are either a variation of H or more limited than H.
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Thirdly, Simpson positions Reverse Mathematics (See Section 2.1) in [91, p. 6]
as a continuation of Hilbert-Bernays’ research, namely as follows:
The development of a portion of ordinary mathematics within [second-
order arithmetic] Z2 is outlined in Supplement IV of Hilbert/Bernays
[. . . ]. The present book may be regarded as a continuation of the
research begun by Hilbert and Bernays.
In conclusion, the foundational studies of Hilbert-Bernays-Ackermann take place in
a language richer than L2, and it is a natural foundational question if anything is
lost by restricting to the latter. By Theorem 3.1, the loss can be extreme: in terms
of comprehension axioms, a proof of the Cousin lemma requires a system as strong
as second-order arithmetic, while this lemma restricted to countable covers/the lan-
guage of second-order arithmetic is provable in a weak system by [91, IV.1].
1.2.3. Foundational consequences. We discuss the compatibility problem for pred-
icative mathematics a` la Weyl-Fefermann. As it turns out, our results solve this
problem in the negative, providing another motivation for this paper.
Russell famously identified an inconsistency in early set theory, known as Rus-
sel’s paradox, based on the ‘set of all sets’ ([98]). According to Russel, the source
of this paradox was circular reasoning: in defining the ‘set of all sets’, one quanti-
fies over all sets, including the one that is being defined. To avoid such problems,
Russel suggested banning any impredicative definition, i.e. a definition in which one
quantifies over the object being defined. The textbook example of an impredicative
definition is the supremum of a bounded set of reals, defined as the least upper
bound of that set. Weyl, a student of Hilbert, initiated the development of pred-
icative mathematics ([102]), i.e. avoiding impredicative definitions, which Feferman
continued ([22–24]). Finally, the fourth ‘Big Five’ system of Reverse Mathematics
is considered the ‘upper limit’ of predicative mathematics (See [91, §I.12]).
In an (similar but much more strict) effort to develop mathematics based on
a predicative notion of number, Nelson introduced predicative arithmetic ([67]).
Unfortunately, predicative arithmetic suffers from the compatibility problem: If two
theorems A,B are both acceptable from the point of view of predicative arithmetic,
it is possible that A ∧B is not ([14]). In this light, the development of predicative
arithmetic seems somewhat arbitrary. It is then a natural question whether Weyl-
Feferman predicative mathematics suffers from the same compatibility problem.
We show that this is the case in Section 4.1. A detailed discussion, also explaining
our notion ‘acceptable in predicative mathematics’, may be found in Remark 4.18.
1.3. Overview of main results. Our main result is that, in terms of the usual
scale of comprehension axioms, a proof of the Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas requires
a system as strong as second-order arithmetic. The same result for the other theo-
rems in Remark 1.1 follows from our main result, as discussed in Section 3.2.2. A
precise statement of our results is found at the end of this section.
Remark 1.1 (Basic theorems).
(i) Cousin lemma: any open cover of [0, 1] has a finite sub-cover ([15]).
(ii) Lindelo¨f lemma: any open cover of R has a countable sub-cover ([50]).
(iii) Besicovitsch and Vitali covering lemmas as in e.g. [1, §2].
(iv) Basic properties of the gauge integral ([6]), like uniqueness, Hake’s theorem,
and extension of the Riemann integral.
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(v) Neighbourhood Function Principle NFP ([96, p. 215]).
(vi) The existence of Lebesgue numbers for any open cover ([32]).
(vii) The Banach-Alaoglu theorem for any open cover ([91, X.2.4], [11, p. 140]).
(viii) The Heine-Young and Lusin-Young theorems, the tile theorem [38, 104],
and the latter’s generalisation due to Rademacher ([74, p. 190]).
(ix) The Bolzano-Weierstrass, Dini, and Arzela` theorems for nets ([43, 58]).
According to Bourbaki’s historical note in [10, Ch. I], the by far most impor-
tant ‘acquisition’ of Schoenflies’ monograph [87] is a theorem which constitutes a
generalisation of the Cousin lemma. Another historical note is that Cousin (and
Lindelo¨f in [50, p. 698]) talks about (uncountable) covers on [15, p. 22] as follows:
if for each s ∈ S there is a circle of finite non-zero radius with s as center (1.1)
In particular, any f : S → R+ gives rise to a cover in the sense of the previous
quote by Cousin as follows: ∪x∈S(x− f(x), x+ f(x)) covers S ⊂ R. A rich history
notwithstanding, the Cousin lemma does not show its age: there are recent attempts
to develop elementary real analysis with this lemma as the ‘centerpiece’ ([94, 95]).
We now make our main results precise, for which some definitions are needed.
Detailed definitions may be found in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
Definition 1.2. Let Z2 be second-order arithmetic as defined in [91, I.2.4] and let
Π1k-CA0 be the fragment of Z2 with comprehension restricted to Π
1
k-formulas.
As noted above, to formulate the theorems from the list, we require a richer
language than that of Z2. We shall make use of RCA
ω
0 , Kohlenbach’s ‘base theory’
of higher-order Reverse Mathematics ([48, §2]), and the associated language of all
finite types. We introduce this framework in detail in Section 2.3.
Definition 1.3. Let (∃3) state the existence of 3E from [7, p. 713, §12.3]; see
Section 2.4 for the exact definition. The functional 3E intuitively speaking decides
any Π1∞-formula. Let (S
2
k) similarly state the existence of a functional deciding Π
1
k-
formulas. For k = 1, the subscript is omitted and (S2) is called the Suslin functional.
We define Π1k-CA
ω
0 ≡ RCAω0 + (S2k), Zω2 := ∪kΠ1k-CAω0 , and ZΩ2 ≡ RCAω0 + (∃3).
We discuss in Remark 2.8 why Definition 1.3 furnishes the ‘right’ (or at least
‘good’) higher-order analogues of the respective second-order systems.
Our main results, to be proved in Section 3, are now as follows:
(i) The Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas are provable in ZΩ2 plus a minimal frag-
ment of the axiom of choice.
(ii) The system Π1k-CA
ω
0 (any k ≥ 1) cannot prove any theorem in Remark 1.1.
(iii) The Cousin lemma is equivalent to basic properties of the gauge integral in
Kohlenbach’s aforementioned framework.
We discuss the (considerable) implications for the Go¨del hierarchy in Section 2.2.
Finally, as noted above, Reverse Mathematics is intimately connected to com-
putability theory, and the same holds for our results; for instance, the functional
defined by (∃3) (resp. (S2k)) can (resp. cannot) compute, in the sense of Section 2.4,
a finite sub-cover from the Cousin lemma on input an open cover of [0, 1].
Our main results in Section 4.1 are then as follows: inspired by the aforemen-
tioned connection, we study the interaction between the theorems from the above
list and the Big Five of Reverse Mathematics given by the Suslin functional S and
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Feferman’s search functional µ from Section 2.4. This leads to surprising results in
(higher-order) Reverse Mathematics, as follows:
(1) The combination of the Cousin lemma and Feferman’s µ yields transfinite
recursion for arithmetical formulas, i.e. the fourth Big Five system. We
derive novel theorems about Borel functions from this result.
(2) The combination of the Cousin lemma and the Suslin functional S yields
Gandy’s superjump, the aforementioned ‘higher-order’ Halting problem.
(3) The combination of the Lindelo¨f lemma for Baire space (resp. a realiser for
the latter) and Feferman’s µ yields Π11-CA0 (resp. the Suslin functional).
As will become clear in Section 4.1.2, the third item solves the compatibility problem
of Weyl-Feferman predicativist mathematics from Section 1.2.3 in the negative. We
also point out that the Lindelo¨f lemma (resp. the Cousin lemma) and Feferman’s
µ are rather weak in isolation, and only become strong when combined.
2. Preliminaries
We sketch the program Reverse Mathematics in Section 2.1, discuss the associ-
ated Go¨del hierarchy in Section 2.2, and introduce second-order and higher-order
arithmetic in Section 2.3. As our main results are proved using techniques from
computability theory, we discuss some essential elements of the latter in Section 2.4.
2.1. Introducing Reverse Mathematics. Reverse Mathematics (RM) is a pro-
gram in the foundations of mathematics initiated around 1975 by Friedman ([26,27])
and developed extensively by Simpson ([91]) and others. We refer to [91] for an
overview of RM and introduce the required definitions (like the ‘base theory’ RCA0)
in Section 2.3.1; we now sketch some of the aspects of RM essential to this paper.
The aim of RM is to find the axioms necessary to prove a statement of ordinary,
i.e. non-set theoretical, mathematics. The classical base theory RCA0 of ‘computable
mathematics’, introduced in Section 2.3.1, is always assumed. Thus, the aim is:
The aim of RM is to find the minimal axioms A such that RCA0
proves [A→ T ] for statements T of ordinary mathematics.
Surprisingly, once the minimal A are known, we almost always also have RCA0 ⊢
[A↔ T ], i.e. we derive the theorem T from the axioms A (the ‘usual’ way of doing
mathematics), but we can also derive the axiom A from the theorem T (the ‘reverse’
way). In light of these ‘reversals’, the field was baptised ‘Reverse Mathematics’.
Perhaps even more surprisingly, in the majority of cases, for a statement T of
ordinary mathematics, either T is provable in RCA0, or the latter proves T ↔ Ai,
where Ai is one of the logical systems WKL0,ACA0, ATR0 or Π
1
1-CA0, which are
all introduced in Section 2.3.1. The latter four together with RCA0 form the ‘Big
Five’ and the aforementioned observation that most mathematical theorems fall into
one of the Big Five categories, is called the Big Five phenomenon ([54, p. 432]).
Furthermore, each of the Big Five has a natural formulation in terms of (Turing)
computability (See [91, I]). As noted by Simpson in [91, I.12], each of the Big Five
also corresponds (sometimes loosely) to a foundational program in mathematics.
Finally, we note that the Big Five systems of RM yield a linear order:
Π11-CA0 → ATR0 → ACA0 →WKL0 → RCA0. (2.1)
By contrast, there are many incomparable logical statements in second-order arith-
metic. For instance, a regular plethora of such statements may be found in the
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Reverse Mathematics zoo in [21]. The latter is intended as a collection of (some-
what natural) theorems outside of the Big Five classification of RM.
2.2. Reverse Mathematics and the Go¨del hierarchy. The Go¨del hierarchy is
a collection of logical systems ordered via consistency strength or (essentially equiv-
alent) inclusion5. This hierarchy is claimed by Simpson to capture most systems
that are natural and/or have foundational import, as follows.
It is striking that a great many foundational theories are linearly
ordered by <. Of course it is possible to construct pairs of artificial
theories which are incomparable under <. However, this is not the
case for the “natural” or non-artificial theories which are usually
regarded as significant in the foundations of mathematics. ([92])
Burgess and Koelner make essentially the same claims in [12, §1.5] and [45, 46].
However, our results imply that the theorems in Remark 1.1 do not fit the Go¨del
hierarchy (with the latter based on inclusion5). In particular, we obtain a branch
that is independent of the medium range of the Go¨del hierarchy, depicted below.
strong


...
supercompact cardinal
...
measurable cardinal
...
ZFC
ZC
simple type theory
ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1
medium


Zω2 ≡ ∪kΠ1k-CAω0
...
Π12-CA
ω
0
Π11-CA
ω
0
ATRω0
ACAω0
{
Cousin and Lindelo¨f lemmas
basic prop. of gauge integral
}
weak


WKLω0
RCAω0
PRA
EFA
bounded arithmetic
Figure 1. The Go¨del hierarchy with a side-branch for the medium range
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✑✰
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✰
✲
✑
✑
✑
✑
✑✸
❜
❜
5Simpson claims in [92, p. 112] that inclusion and consistency strength yield the same (Go¨del)
hierarchy as depicted in [92, Table 1], i.e. this choice does not matter.
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Arguably, the Go¨del hierarchy is a central object of study in mathematical logic,
as e.g. stated by Simpson in [92, p. 112] or Burgess in [12, p. 40]. Some remarks on
the technical details concerning Figure 1 are as follows.
(1) Note that we use a non-essential modification of the Go¨del hierarchy,
namely involving systems of higher-order arithmetic, like e.g. ACAω0 instead
of ACA0; these systems are (at least) Π
1
2-conservative over the associated
second-order system (See e.g. [81, Theorem 2.2]).
(2) In the spirit of RM, we show in [71] that the Cousin lemma and (a version
of) the Lindelo¨f lemma are provable without the use of QF-AC0,1, as also
discussed in Remark 3.16.
(3) The system ZΩ2 is placed between the medium and strong range, as the
combination of the recursor R2 from Go¨del’s T and ∃3 yields a system
stronger than ZΩ2 . The system Π
1
k-CA
ω
0 is more robust in this sense.
(4) Despite Simpson’s grand claim in the above quote, there are now some
examples of logical systems that fall outside of the Go¨del hierarchy, like
special cases of Ramsey’s theorem and the axiom of determinacy ([39,53]).
Finally, in light of the equivalences involving the gauge integral and the Cousin
lemma (See Section 3.3), the latter seriously challenges the ‘Big Five’ classification
from RM, the linear nature of the Go¨del hierarchy, as well as Feferman’s claim
that the mathematics necessary for the development of physics can be formalised
in relatively weak logical systems (See Remark 3.29 for the latter claim).
2.3. The framework of Reverse Mathematics. We introduce axiomatic sys-
tems essential to RM. We start with a sketch of second-order arithmetic (See
[91, I.2.4]), the framework of Friedman-Simpson RM, and finish with higher-order
artihmetic, the framework of Kohlenbach’s higher-order RM (See [48]).
2.3.1. Second-order arithmetic and fragments. The language L2 of second-order
arithmetic Z2 has two sorts of variables: number variables n,m, k, l, . . . intended
to range over the natural numbers, and set variables X,Y, Z, . . . intended to range
over sets of natural numbers. The constants of L2 are 0, 1, <N,+N,×N,=N and ∈,
which are intended to have their usual meaning (by the axioms introduced below).
Formulas and terms are built up from these constants in the usual way.
Definition 2.1. Second-order arithmetic Z2 consists of three axiom schemas:
(1) Basic axioms expressing that 0, 1, <N,+N,×N form an ordered semi-ring
with equality =N.
(2) Induction: For anyX ,
(
0 ∈ X∧(∀n)(n ∈ X → n+1 ∈ X))→ (∀n)(n ∈ X).
(3) Comprehension: For any formula ϕ(n) of L2 which does not involve the
variable X , we have (∃X)(∀n)(n ∈ X ↔ ϕ(n)).
Induction is well-known, while comprehension intuitively expresses that any L2-
formula ϕ(n) yields a set X = {n ∈ N : ϕ(n)} consisting of exactly those numbers
n ∈ N satisfying ϕ(n). Now, fragments of Z2 are obtained by restricting compre-
hension (and induction), for which the following definition is needed.
Definition 2.2. [Formula classes]
(1) A formula of L2 is quantifier-free (Σ
0
0 or Π
0
0) if it does not involve quantifiers.
To be clear: variables are allowed; only quantifiers are banned.
ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNCOUNTABLE 9
(2) A formula of L2 is arithmetical (Σ
1
0 or Π
1
0) if it only involves quantifiers over
number variables, i.e. set quantifiers like (∃X) and (∀Y ) are not allowed.
(3) An arithmetical formula is Σ0k+1 (resp. Π
0
k+1) if it has the form (∃n)ϕ(n)
(resp. (∀n)ϕ(n)) with ϕ in Π0k (resp. in Σ0k).
(4) A formula of L2 is Σ
1
k+1 (resp. Π
1
k+1) if it has the form (∃X)ϕ(X) (resp.
(∀X)ϕ(X)) with ϕ in Π1k (resp. in Σ1k).
(5) A formula of L2 is ∆
i
k+1 if it is both Π
i
k+1 and Σ
i
k+1 for i = 0, 1.
Intuitively, a Σ0k-formula is a quantifier-free formula pre-fixed by k alternating
number quantifiers, starting with an existential one; a Σ1k-formula is an arithmetical
formula pre-fixed by k alternating set quantifiers, starting with an existential one.
The Π-formulas are (equivalent to) negations of the corresponding Σ-versions.
Using the above, the third and fifth ‘Big Five’ systems ACA0 and Π
1
1-CA0 are
just Z2 with comprehension restricted to resp. arithmetical and Π
1
1-formulas. Al-
ternatively, ACA0 allows one to build sets using finite iterations of Turing’s Halting
problem ([97]), aka the Turing jump; intuitively, ATR0 extends this to transfinite
recursion, i.e. the unbounded iteration of the Turing jump along any countable
well-ordering. Furthermore, the ‘base theory’ RCA0 is Z2 with comprehension re-
stricted to ∆01-formulas, plus induction for Σ
0
1-formulas. As discussed in [91, II
and IX.3], ∆01-comprehension essentially expresses that ‘all computable sets exists’,
while Σ01-induction corresponds to primitive recursion in the sense of Hilbert’s fini-
tistic mathematics. The system WKL0 is just RCA0 extended by the weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma6 (WKL hereafter) which states that an infinite binary tree has a path.
Finally, in light of the previous and (2.1), the Big Five only constitute a very tiny
fragment of Z2; on a related note, the RM of topology does give rise to theorems
equivalent to Π12-CA0 ([61]), but that is the current upper bound of RM to the best
of our knowledge. In particular, if Π1k-CA0 is Z2 restricted to Π
1
k-comprehension,
then this system can be said to ‘go beyond Friedman-Simpson RM’ for k ≥ 3.
2.3.2. Higher-order arithmetic and fragments. As suggested by its name, higher-
order arithmetic extends second-order arithmetic. Indeed, while the latter is re-
stricted to numbers and sets of numbers, higher-order arithmetic also has sets of
sets of numbers, sets of sets of sets of numbers, et cetera. To formalise this idea,
we introduce the collection of all finite types T, defined by the two clauses:
(i) 0 ∈ T and (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T then (σ → τ) ∈ T,
where 0 is the type of natural numbers, and σ → τ is the type of mappings from
objects of type σ to objects of type τ . In this way, 1 ≡ 0→ 0 is the type of functions
from numbers to numbers, and where n + 1 ≡ n → 0. Viewing sets as given by
their characteristic function, we note that Z2 only includes objects of type 0 and 1.
The language of Lω consists of variables x
ρ, yρ, zρ, . . . of any finite type ρ ∈ T.
Types may be omitted when they can be inferred from context. The constants of
Lω includes the type 0 objects 0, 1 and <0,+0,×0,=0 which are intended to have
the same meaning as their N-subscript counterparts in Z2. Equality at higher types
is defined in terms of ‘=0’ as follows: for any objects x
τ , yτ , we have
[x =τ y] ≡ (∀zτ11 . . . zτkk )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk], (2.2)
6To be absolutely clear, we take ‘WKL’ to be the L2-sentence every infinite binary tree has a
path as in [91], while the Big Five system WKL0 is RCA0 +WKL, and WKL
ω
0 is RCA
ω
0 +WKL.
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if the type τ is composed as τ ≡ (τ1 → . . . → τk → 0). Furthermore, Lω also
includes the recursor constant Rσ for any σ ∈ T, which allows for iteration on type
σ-objects as in the special case (2.3). Formulas and terms are defined as usual.
Definition 2.3. The base theory RCAω0 consists of the following axioms:
(1) Basic axioms expressing that 0, 1, <0,+0,×0 form an ordered semi-ring with
equality =0.
(2) Basic axioms defining the well-known Π and Σ combinators (aka K and S
in [2]), which allow for the definition of λ-abstraction.
(3) The defining axiom of the recursor constant R0: For m
0 and f1:
R0(f,m, 0) := m and R0(f,m, n+ 1) := f(R0(f,m, n)). (2.3)
(4) The axiom of extensionality: for all ρ, τ ∈ T, we have:
(∀xρ, yρ, ϕρ→τ )[x =ρ y → ϕ(x) =τ ϕ(y)]. (Eρ,τ )
(5) The induction axiom for quantifier-free7 formulas.
(6) QF-AC1,0: The quantifier-free axiom of choice as in Definition 2.4.
Definition 2.4. The axiom QF-AC consists of the following for all σ, τ ∈ T:
(∀xσ)(∃yτ )A(x, y)→ (∃Y σ→τ )(∀xσ)A(x, Y (x)) (QF-ACσ,τ )
for any quantifier-free formula A in the language of Lω.
As discussed in [48, §2], RCAω0 and RCA0 prove the same sentences ‘up to lan-
guage’ as the latter is set-based and the former function-based.
Furthermore, recursion as in (2.3) is called primitive recursion; the class of func-
tionals obtained from Rρ for all ρ ∈ T is called Go¨del’s system T of all (higher-
order) primitive recursive functionals.
We use the usual notations for natural, rational, and real numbers, and the
associated functions, as introduced in [48, p. 288-289].
Definition 2.5 (Real numbers and related notions in RCAω0 ).
(i) Natural numbers correspond to type zero objects, and we use ‘n0’ and
‘n ∈ N’ interchangeably. Rational numbers are defined as signed quotients
of natural numbers, and ‘q ∈ Q’ and ‘<Q’ have their usual meaning.
(ii) Real numbers are coded by fast-converging Cauchy sequences q(·) : N → Q,
i.e. such that (∀n0, i0)(|qn − qn+i)| <Q 12n ). We use Kohlenbach’s ‘hat
function’ from [48, p. 289] to guarantee that every f1 defines a real number.
(iii) We write ‘x ∈ R’ to express that x1 := (q1(·)) represents a real as in the
previous item and write [x](k) := qk for the k-th approximation of x.
(iv) Two reals x, y represented by q(·) and r(·) are equal, denoted x =R y, if
(∀n0)(|qn − rn| ≤ 12n−1 ). Inequality ‘<R’ is defined similarly.
(v) Functions F : R → R mapping reals to reals are represented by Φ1→1
mapping equal reals to equal reals, i.e. (∀x, y)(x =R y → Φ(x) =R Φ(y)).
(vi) The relation ‘x ≤τ y’ is defined as in (2.2) but with ‘≤0’ instead of ‘=0’.
(vii) Sets of type ρ objects Xρ→0, Y ρ→0, . . . are given by their characteristic
functions fρ→0X , i.e. (∀xρ)[x ∈ X ↔ fX(x) =0 1], where fρ→0X ≤ρ→0 1.
7To be absolutely clear, similar to Definition 2.2, variables (of any finite type) are allowed in
quantifier-free formulas: only quantifiers are banned.
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We sometimes omit the subscript ‘R’ if it is clear from context. We also introduce
some notation to handle finite sequences nicely.
Notation 2.6 (Finite sequences). We assume a dedicated type for ‘finite sequences
of objects of type ρ’, namely ρ∗. Since the usual coding of pairs of numbers goes
through in RCAω0 , we shall not always distinguish between 0 and 0
∗. Similarly, we
do not always distinguish between ‘sρ’ and ‘〈sρ〉’, where the former is ‘the object
s of type ρ’, and the latter is ‘the sequence of type ρ∗ with only element sρ’. The
empty sequence for the type ρ∗ is denoted by ‘〈〉ρ’, usually with the typing omitted.
Furthermore, we denote by ‘|s| = n’ the length of the finite sequence sρ∗ =
〈sρ0, sρ1, . . . , sρn−1〉, where |〈〉| = 0, i.e. the empty sequence has length zero. For
sequences sρ
∗
, tρ
∗
, we denote by ‘s∗t’ the concatenation of s and t, i.e. (s∗t)(i) = s(i)
for i < |s| and (s∗t)(j) = t(|s|−j) for |s| ≤ j < |s|+|t|. For a sequence sρ∗ , we define
sN := 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(N − 1)〉 for N0 < |s|. For a sequence α0→ρ, we also write
αN = 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N−1)〉 for any N0. By way of shorthand, (∀qρ ∈ Qρ∗)A(q)
abbreviates (∀i0 < |Q|)A(Q(i)), which is (equivalent to) quantifier-free if A is.
2.4. Higher-order computability theory. As noted above, our main results
will be proved using techniques from computability theory. Thus, we first make our
notion of ‘computability’ precise as follows.
(I) We adopt ZFC, i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice,
as the official metatheory for all results, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
(II) We adopt Kleene’s notion of higher-order computation as given by his nine
clauses S1-S9 (See [51, 80]) as our official notion of ‘computable’.
For the rest of this section, we introduce some existing functionals which will be
used below. These functionals constitute the counterparts of Z2, and some of the
Big Five systems, in higher-order RM. First of all, ACA0 is readily derived from:
(∃µ2)[(∀f1)((∃n)(f(n) = 0)→ f(µ(f)) = 0)], (µ2)
and ACAω0 ≡ RCAω0 + (µ2) proves the same Π12-sentences as ACA0 by [81, Theo-
rem 2.2]. The functional µ2 in (µ2) is also called Feferman’s µ ([2]), and is clearly
discontinuous at f =1 11 . . . ; in fact, (µ
2) is equivalent to the existence of F : R → R
such that F (x) = 1 if x >R 0, and 0 otherwise ([48, §3]).
Secondly, Π11-CA0 is readily derived from the following sentence:
(∃S2 ≤2 1)(∀f1)
[
(∃g1)(∀x0)(f(gn) = 0)↔ S(f) = 0], (S2)
and Π11-CA
ω
0 ≡ RCAω0 + (S2) proves the same Π13-sentences as Π11-CA0 by [81, The-
orem 2.2]. The functional S2 in (S2) is also called the Suslin functional ([48]).
By definition, the Suslin functional S2 can decide whether a Σ11-formula (as in the
left-hand side of (S2)) is true or false. We similarly define the functional S2k which
decides the truth or falsity of Σ1k-formulas; we also define the system Π
1
k-CA
ω
0 as
RCAω0 + (S
2
k), where (S
2
k) expresses that the functional S
2
k exists.
Thirdly, full second-order arithmetic Z2 is readily derived from the sentence:
(∃E3 ≤3 1)(∀Y 2)
[
(∃f1)Y (f) = 0↔ E(Y ) = 0], (∃3)
and we define ZΩ2 ≡ RCAω0 + (∃3), which is a conservative extension of Z2 by
[41, Cor. 2.6]. The (unique) functional from (∃3) is also called ‘∃3’, and we will use
a similar convention for other functionals.
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Fourth, there is primitive recursive function U such that ‘U(e, k, n) =0 m + 1’
expresses that the e-th Turing machine with input k halts after n steps with output
m. By definition, Feferman’s µ2 provides an upper bound on this n if it exists, i.e.
we can use µ2 to solve the Halting problem. Similarly, Gandy’s superjump solves
the Halting problem for higher-order computability as follows:
S(F 2, e0) :=
{
0 if {e}(F ) terminates
1 otherwise
, (S3)
where e is an S1-S9-index. A characterisation of S in terms of discontinuities may be
found in [34]. Clearly, the above functionals are natural counterparts of (set-based)
comprehension axioms in a functional-based language.
Fifth, recall that the Cousin lemma from Remark 1.1 states the existence of
a finite sub-cover for an open cover of the unit interval. Since Cantor space is
homeomorphic to a closed subset of [0, 1], the former inherits the same property. In
particular, for any G2, the corresponding ‘canonical cover’ of 2N is ∪f∈2N [fG(f)]
where [σ0
∗
] is the set of all binary extensions of σ. By compactness, there is
a finite sequence 〈f0, . . . , fn〉 such that the set of ∪i≤n[f¯iG(fi)] still covers 2N.
We now introduce the specification SCF(Θ) for a (non-unique) functional Θ which
computes such a finite sequence. We refer to such a functional Θ as a realiser for
the compactness of Cantor space, and simplify its type to ‘3’ to improve readability.
Definition 2.7. The formula SCF(Θ) is as follows for Θ2→1
∗
:
(∀G2)(∀f1 ≤1 1)(∃g ∈ Θ(G))(f ∈ [gG(g)]). (2.4)
where ‘f ∈ [gG(g)]’ is the quantifier-free formula fG(g) =0∗ gG(g).
Clearly, there is no unique Θ as in (2.4) (just add more binary sequences to
Θ(G)); nonetheless, we have in the past referred to any Θ satisfying SCF(Θ) as
‘the’ special fan functional Θ, and we will continue this abuse of language. We
shall however repeatedly point out the non-unique nature of the special fan func-
tional Θ in the following. While Θ may appear exotic at first, it provides the
only method we can think of for computing gauge integrals in general, as discussed
in Remark 3.27. As to its provenance, Θ was introduced as part of the study of
the Gandy-Hyland functional in [82, §2] via a slightly different definition. These
definitions are identical up to a term of Go¨del’s T of low complexity.
Finally, we should discuss why the above systems involving the ‘ω’ superscripts
are the ‘right’ (or at least ‘good’) higher-order analogues of the correspoding second-
order systems. We also discuss the special case of ZΩ2 and second-order arithmetic.
Remark 2.8. First of all, Kohlenbach introduces RCAω0 in [48] as the base theory
for higher-order RM and proves that it is conservative over RCA0 up to language.
Hence, it makes sense to similarly use the superscript ‘ω’ to denote the higher-order
counterparts of subsystems of second-order arithmetic Z2
Secondly, most of the aforementioned systems with superscript ‘ω’ are known
conservative extensions (for at least Π12-formulas) of their second-order counter-
parts. For RCAω0 , this follows from [48, Prop. 3.1]. For ACA
ω
0 and Π
1
1-CA
ω
0 , this
follows from [81, Theorem 2.2], while for Zω2 and Z
Ω
2 this follows from [41, Cor. 2.6].
Similar results for Π1k-CA
ω
0 can be obtained in the same way.
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Thirdly, as noted below Figure 1 in Section 2.2, ZΩ2 is placed between the medium
and strong range. The motivation is that the combination of the recursor R2 from
Go¨del’s T and ∃3 yields a system stronger than ZΩ2 . On the other hand, the system
Zω2 does not suffer from this problem, and we therefore believe that the latter is the
‘right’ higher-order analogue of second-order arithmetic Z2.
3. Main results I
We establish our main results as sketched in Section 1.3. We treat the Cousin
lemma in full detail in Section 3.1, while similar ‘covering theorems’ from Re-
mark 1.1 are treated analogously in Section 3.2. We show in Section 3.3 that the
Cousin lemma is equivalent to various basic properties of the gauge integral. In
Section 3.4, we derive the Cousin lemma from the following generalisation of the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: every net in the unit interval has a convergent sub-
net. Nets (aka Moore-Smith sequences) provide a generalisation of the concept of
sequences beyond countable index sets, going back a century ([57, 58]).
3.1. Cousin lemma. Cousin first proved (what is now known as) the Cousin
lemma before 1893 ([20]). This lemma essentially expresses that I = [0, 1] is
Heine-Borel compact, i.e. that any open cover of I has a finite sub-cover. The
goal of this section is to establish that, despite its seemingly elementary nature,
the Cousin lemma can only be proved in full second-order arithmetic, as sketched
in Section 1.3. This should be contrasted with the restriction to countable covers,
which may be proved in the weak fragment WKL0 by [91, IV.1.2]).
First of all, a functional Ψ : R → R+ gives rise to the (uncountable) canonical
open cover ∪x∈IIΨx where IΨx is the open interval (x−Ψ(x), x+Ψ(x)). Hence, the
Cousin lemma implies that ∪x∈IIΨx has a finite sub-cover; in symbols:
(∀Ψ : R → R+)(∃〈y1, . . . , yk〉)(∀x ∈ I)(∃i ≤ k)(x ∈ IΨyi). (HBU)
Note that HBU makes use of the original formulation by Cousin as in (1.1). We
show in [83, §3.4] that HBU sports a certain robustness, in that its logical properties
do not depend on the exact choice of definition of cover.
The main goal of this section is to prove the following theorem, which establishes
that full second-order arithmetic is needed to prove the Cousin lemma as in HBU.
Theorem 3.1. ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1 proves HBU; no system Π1k-CA
ω
0 proves HBU.
The first part is a necessity as otherwise the designation “analysis” for Z2 would
be meaningless ([88, p. 291]). The second part constitutes a surprise: the restriction
of HBU to countable covers is equivalent to WKL0 ([91, IV.1]), a system with the
(first-order) strength of RCAω0 . Kohlenbach has introduced generalisations ofWKL0
with properties similar to HBU ([47, §5-6]), but these axioms do not stem from
mathematics, i.e. are ‘purely logical’. Furthermore, HBU is robust ([54, p. 432]) in
that restricting the variable x to the (Turing) computable reals or the rationals in
I does not make a difference. We now prove the first part of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2. The system ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1 proves HBU.
Proof. We only sketch the proof as it makes use of items from Remark 1.1 to be
studied in Section 3.2. A full proof may be found in Theorem 3.14. Now, to derive
HBU, we note that the Lindelo¨f lemma provides a countable sub-cover for any open
cover of I. Since (∃3) immediately implies Z2, we may use [91, IV.1.2], which
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implies that every countable open cover has a finite sub-cover. What remains is to
prove the Lindelo¨f lemma, which readily follows from the Neighbourhood function
principle NFP, i.e. item (v) in Remark 1.1, as will become clear in the proof of
Theorem 3.14. In turn, NFP has a straightforward proof in ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1, as will
also become clear in the proof of Theorem 3.14. 
As noted above, we shall make use of computability theory to establish Theo-
rem 3.1. Hence, we first show that HBU is equivalent to the existence of the special
fan functional Θ in Theorem 3.3. Theorem 3.1 will then be established by showing
that models of Π1k-CA
ω
0 do not always contain Θ as in Theorem 3.4. Note that the
functional Ω as in (3.1) is called a realiser for HBU.
Theorem 3.3. ACAω0 + QF-AC
2,1 proves (∃Θ)SCF(Θ)↔ HBU↔ (3.1), where
(∃Ω2→1∗)(∀Ψ : R → R+)(∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃y ∈ Ω(Ψ)(x ∈ IΨy ). (3.1)
Proof. We first point out two useful properties of Feferman’s µ: the axiom (µ2)
defining the latter functional is equivalent to the existence of F : R → R such that
F (x) = 1 if x >R 0, and 0 otherwise ([48, §3]). Furthermore, by repeatedly applying
µ, we can show that any arithmetical formula is equivalent to a quantifier-free one.
We also recall the notation ‘f ∈ [σ]’ for covers of Cantor space from Definition 2.7.
Based on the previous, given Ψ, y1, . . . , yk as in HBU, we can decide if the inter-
vals IΨyi form an open covering or not: we just check (using µ) how the end-points
of these intervals are interleaved. Thus, using µ as a parameter, we can deduce
(3.1) from HBU by QF-AC2,1. Likewise, given f1, . . . , fn ≤1 1 and k1, . . . , kn in N,
we can decide if the set of neighbourhoods [f¯iki] form a covering or not; hence, we
may use QF-AC2,1 to similarly obtain Θ from the compactness of Cantor space.
Now define ξ(f) =
∑
i∈N f(i) · 2−(i+1) and ζ(f) =
∑
i∈N 2f(i) · 3−(i+1) for f ∈
{0, 1}N; note that ξ is a continuous projection of {0, 1}N to [0, 1], while ζ is the
homeomorphism between {0, 1}N and the classical Cantor space Cc. Using ξ and
ζ, we can convert canonical covers between I and Cantor space as follows:
• For Ψ : [0, 1]→ R+, define FΨ(f) as the least n such that [f¯n] ⊆ ξ−1(IΨξ(f)).
• For F : {0, 1}N → N, we define ΨF (x) as the distance from x to Cc if
x 6∈ Cc, and as the least rational (in some canonical enumeration of Q+) q
such that ζ−1((x − q, x+ q)) ⊆ [ζ−1(x)F (ζ−1(x))] if x ∈ Cc.
These constructions are arithmetical, and the compactness property for the associ-
ated coverings are transferred from one space to the other in both directions. 
From the proof, we may also conclude that there is a term t such that if SCF(Θ)
and Ω := t(Θ, µ) then Ω satisfies (3.1), and conversely, there is a term s such that if
Ω satisfies (3.1) and Θ := s(Ω, µ), then SCF(Θ). The proof makes use of the Axiom
of Choice (as in QF-AC) to obtain a functional Θ as in SCF(Θ), resp. Ω satisfying
(3.1), from the existence of finite sub-coverings. Nonetheless, a careful analysis of
known proofs of HBU yields such functionals Θ and Ω without the Axiom of Choice.
We discuss this in more detail in Remark 3.9 below. Finally, we point out that
ACAω0 + QF-AC is also Π
1
2-conservative over ACA0 by [81, Theorem 2.2].
To establish Theorem 3.1, we now exhibit a model (aka type structure) of Π1k-CA
ω
0
in which there is no special fan functional and in which HBU fails; hence Π1k-CA
ω
0
cannot prove HBU by the soundness theorem.
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Theorem 3.4. There is a type structure validating Π1k-CA
ω
0 (for all k), and at the
same time satisfying (∀Θ3)¬SCF(Θ) and ¬HBU.
Proof. We introduce a family of type structures validating (∀Θ3)¬SCF(Θ). The-
orem 3.8 below tells us that one of those structures contains all S1k and is closed
under S1-S9, establishing the theorem. Intuitively speaking, we start from a β-
model A and have that any functional G : A→ N which is computable in some S2k
and elements from A will be total over NN by the same algorithm. By absoluteness,
there are f1, . . . , fn in A inducing a covering of 2
N of the standard form. Since it is
flexible which objects of type 2 we include in an extension of A to a typed structure,
A together with the S2k’s cannot “decide” whether there is Θ as in SCF(Θ).
Let A ⊆ NN be a countable set such that all Π1k-statements with parameters from
A are absolute for A. Also, let S2k be the characteristic function of a complete Π
1
k-
set for each k; we also write S2k for the restriction of this functional to A. Clearly,
for f ∈ NN computable in any S2k and some f1, . . . , fn from A, f is also in A.
Convention 3.5. Since A is countable, we write A as the increasing union
⋃
k∈N An
where A0 consists of the hyperarithmetical functions and for k > 0 we have:
• There is an element in Ak enumerating Ak−1.
• Ak is the closure of a finite set g1, . . . , gnk under computability in S2k.
For the sake of uniform terminology, we rename ∃2 to S20 and let the associated
finite sequence g1, . . . , gn0 be the empty list.
We now define the functional F 2 on A as follows.
Definition 3.6. [The functional F ] Define F (f) for f ∈ A as follows:
• If f 6∈ 2N, put F (f) := 0.
• If f ∈ 2N, let k be minimal such that f ∈ Ak. We put F (f) := 2−(k+2+e).
where e is a ‘minimal’ index for computing f from S2k and {g1, . . . , gnk}
as follows: the ordinal rank of this computation of f is minimal and e is
minimal among the indices for f of the same ordinal rank.
By definition, F as in Definition 3.6 is injective on A0 and on each set Ak+1 \Ak.
Moreover, if m is the usual measure on 2N, we see that
m
(⋃
f∈A0 [f¯F (f)]
) ≤ 2−1 and m(⋃f∈Ak+1\Ak [f¯F (f)]) ≤ 2−(k+2). (3.2)
As a consequence, if F is extended to a total functional G and Θ satisfies SCF(Θ),
then Θ(G) cannot be a finite list from A. Similarly, a finite sequence 〈f1, . . . , fn〉 in
A is already in some ∪k≤mAk, and (3.2) implies that ∪i≤n[fiG(fi)] does not cover
Cantor space, for any total extension G of F .
Thus, for any type structure Tp = {Tpn}n∈N where Tp0 = N, Tp1 = A and
F ∈ Tp2, there is no instance of Θ as in SCF(Θ) in Tp3. To establish the theorem,
we require one such type structure, containing each S2k and F , and closed under
Kleene’s S1-S9; such a type structure is provided by Theorem 3.8, i.e. the latter
establishes the theorem, and we are done. 
For Theorem 3.8, we require some properties of F 2 from Definition 3.6.
Lemma 3.7 (Properties of the functional F ).
(1) For each k, the restriction of F to Ak is computable in the functions
g1, . . . , gnk from Convention 3.5, and the functional S
2
k.
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(2) Let G be any total extension of F , let f1, . . . , fm ∈ A, and assume that the
function f is computable in G, f1, . . . , fm and some S
2
k. Then also f ∈ A.
Proof. For the first part, we use induction on k. For k = 0, we use Gandy se-
lection ([51, p. 210]) for ∃2 which permits us to compute an ∃2 index for each
hyperarithmetical function. For k > 0, we use that S2l is computable in S
2
k when
l < k and that we have enumerations of each of the sets A0, . . . , Ak−1 computable
in g1, . . . , gnk and S
2
k. Then we can apply the induction hypothesis for f ∈ Al for
some l < k and the Gandy selection method relative to S2k for f ∈ Ak \ Ak−1. For
the second part, without loss of generality, we may assume that f1, . . . , fm are all
in Ak. By the first part of this lemma, G restricted to Ak is computable in S
2
k, and
Ak is closed under computations relative to S
2
k. The claim now follows. 
Theorem 3.8. There is a type structure {Tpn}n∈N, closed under Kleene’s S1-S9,
such that Tp0 = N and:
(1) Tp1 is a countable subset A of N
N such that all analytical statements (i.e.
any Π1m-sentence, for any m) are absolute for A.
(2) Tp2 contains the restrictions of all S
2
k to A.
(3) There exists F ∈ Tp2 inducing an open covering of A for which there is no
finite sub-covering in the type structure.
Proof. The theorem expresses exactly what Tpn has to be for n = 0 and n = 1. For
n > 1, we recursively let Tpn consist of all functionals φ : Tpn−1 → N that are S1-
S9-computable in F , some S2k, and elements from A, where F is as in Definition 3.6.
This type structure has the desired property. Note that Feferman’s µ is S1-S9-
computable from ∃2, and the former immediately yields QF-AC1,0. 
The proof of Theorem 3.1 is now done. As to the role of QF-AC0,1, we show in
[71, §4] that HBU is provable in ZΩ2 , i.e. without QF-AC0,1, as well as the construction
of a type structure of Π1k-CA
ω
0 + QF-AC
0,1 in which ¬HBU holds. Thus, QF-AC0,1
is not essential for obtaining HBU. We finish this section with a remark.
Remark 3.9 (The Axiom of Choice and Θ). First of all, the (quantifier-free)
Axiom of Choice is used to establish the existence of Θ in Theorem 3.3, while by
[84, Cor. 3.29], Θ can be computed (via a term from Go¨del’s T ) from a version of ∃3
enriched with quantifier-free choice. However, Borel’s construction from [9, p. 52]
can be applied to our notion of canonical cover, yielding a countable sub-cover
without using the Axiom of Choice. Furthermore, the instance Θ0 of the special
fan functional from [69, §5.1] is defined using Borel’s construction.
3.2. Lindelo¨f lemma and similar theorems. We establish results analogous to
Theorem 3.1 for some of the other theorems from Remark 1.1. We discuss how
these theorems are used in mathematics in Remark 3.17.
3.2.1. Lindelo¨f lemma. We recall that Lindelo¨f proved the Lindelo¨f lemma in 1903
([50]), while Young and Riesz proved a similar theorem in 1902 and 1905 ([79,103]);
this lemma expresses that any open cover of any subset of Rn has a countable sub-
cover. We study variations of this lemma restricted to R, while Baire space is
studied in Section 4.1.2. We believe LIND is the closest to Lindelo¨f’s original8.
8Lindelo¨f formulates his lemma in [50, p. 698] as follows: Soit (P) un ensemble quelconque
situe´ dans l’espace Rn et, de chaque point P comme centre, construisons une sphe`re SP d’un
rayon ρP qui peut varier de l’un point a` l’autre; il existe une infinite´ de´nombrable de ces sphe`res
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Definition 3.10. [LIND] For every Ψ : R → R+, there is a sequence of open
intervals ∪n∈N(an, bn) covering R such that (∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ R)[(an, bn) = IΨx ].
Definition 3.11. [LIND2] (∀Ψ : R → R+)(∃Φ0→1)(∀x ∈ R)(∃n0)(x ∈ IΨΦ(n)).
Definition 3.12. [LIND3] (∃Ξ)(∀Ψ : R → R+)(∀x ∈ R)(∃n0)(x ∈ IΨΞ(Ψ)(n)).
The following theorem establishes the connection between LIND and HBU, while
also showing that the introduction of Ξ or Φ does not change LIND much.
Theorem 3.13. The system RCAω0 + QF-AC
0,1 proves [LIND+WKL]↔ HBU and
ACAω0 + QF-AC
0,1 proves LIND↔ LIND2 ↔ LIND3.
Proof. For the first part, WKL0 implies that every countable cover of I has a finite
sub-cover by [91, IV.1.2]. Hence, LIND + WKL0 → HBU → WKL0 is immediate,
while HBU clearly generalises to [−N,N ] for any natural number N0. Putting all
the finite sub-covers of [−N,N ] together (using µ2 and QF-AC0,1), one obtains the
countable cover needed for LIND, assuming (µ2). On the other hand, if ¬(µ2) then
all functions on the reals are continuous by [48, Prop. 3.9 and 3.12]. But ∪q∈QIΨq is
a countable sub-cover of the canonical sub-cover for continuous Ψ : R → R+, and
hence LIND follows. The law of excluded middle (µ2)∨¬(µ2) now finishes this part.
For the second part, we only need to prove the forward implications. So assume
LIND and note that the formula ‘(an, bn) = I
Ψ
x ’ is just an =R x − Ψ(x) ∧ bn =R
x+Ψ(x), which is Π01, i.e. this formula is decidable using µ
2, and we can treat it as
quantifier-free in ACAω0 . Now apply QF-AC
0,1 to (∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ R)[(an, bn) = IΨx ]
to obtain LIND2. For the final implication, we use the same argument as in the
first part, establishing HBU relativised to [−N,N ], and now combined with the
existence of the functional Ω as in (3.1). 
The local equivalence of ‘epsilon-delta’ and sequential continuity is not provable
in ZF, while QF-AC0,1 suffices to establish the equivalence in a general context
(See [48, Rem. 3.13] for details). It is then a natural question whether the use of
QF-AC0,1 in the theorem is similarly essential. This question is deviously subtle, as
discussed in Remark 3.16. We show in [71, §4] that ACAω0 in Theorems 3.3 and 3.13
can be weakened to RCAω0 plus the existence of the classical fan functional.
Theorem 3.14. ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1 proves LIND; no system Π1k-CA
ω
0 proves LIND.
Proof. The second part is immediate from Theorems 3.1 and 3.13. The first part
is proved by proving item (v) from Remark 1.1 in ZΩ2 , and deriving LIND from this
item. Thus, consider the following for any Π1∞-formula A with any parameter:
(∀f1)(∃n0)A(fn)→ (∃γ1 ∈ K0)(∀f1)A(fγ(f)). (NFP)
Here, ‘γ1 ∈ K0’ expresses that γ1 is an associate, which is the same as a code from
RM by [47, Prop. 4.4]. Formally, ‘γ1 ∈ K0’ is the following formula:
(∀f1)(∃n0)(γ(fn) >0 0) ∧ (∀n0,m0, f1, )(m > n ∧ γ(fn) > 0→ γ(fn) =0 γ(fm)).
The value γ(f) for γ ∈ K0 is defined as the unique γ(fn) − 1 for n large enough.
Now, since A as in NFP is a Π1k-formula for some k, we may treat it as quantifier-
free given (∃3). Applying QF-AC1,0 to the antecedent of NFP, there is Y 2 such
de telle sorte que tout point de l’ensemble donne´ soit inte´rieur a` au moins l’une d’elles. Applying
QF-AC0,1 to LIND, one could obtain Φ0→1 such that (∀n ∈ N)[(an, bn) = IΨΦ(n)], but such a
functional is nowhere to be found in Lindelo¨f’s original formulation.
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that (∀f1)A(fY (f)). Define Z2 using (∃3) as follows: Z(f) is the least n ≤ Y (f)
such that A(fn) if it exists, and zero otherwise. Note that Z is continuous on NN
and hence has an associate by [47, Prop. 4.7]. Alternatively, define the associate
γ1 directly as follows: for w0
∗
, define γ(w) as the least n ≤ |w| such that A(wn) if
such there is, and zero otherwise. Clearly, we have γ ∈ K0 and (∀f1)A(fγ(f)), i.e.
NFP follows. Finally, LIND follows from the latter by considering:
(∀x ∈ R)(∃n ∈ N)[(∃y ∈ R)(([x]( 12n )− 1n , [x]( 12n ) + 1n ) ⊂ IΨy )] (3.3)
for Ψ : R → R+, and where the formula in square brackets is abbreviated A(xn).
This is a slight abuse of notation, as (only) the first 2n elements in the sequence x1
are being used in (3.3). Applying NFP to (3.3), we obtain γ ∈ K0 such that:
(∀x ∈ R)(∃y ∈ R)[([x]( 1
2γ(x)
)− 1
γ(x) , [x](
1
2γ(x)
) + 1
γ(x)) ⊂ IΨy
]
. (3.4)
Note that the formula in square brackets in (3.4) is arithmetical (including the
formula needed to make the notation γ(x) work). Hence, using QF-AC0,1 and (µ2),
there is a functional Φ which provides the real y from (3.4) on input x ∈ Q. The
countable sub-cover of ∪x∈RIΨx can then be found by enumerating Φ(qw) for all finite
sequences w0
∗
of rationals which represent rationals q0w and are such that γ(w) >0 0.
In particular, every x ∈ R is in some IΨy by (3.4), and since v0
∗
:= x2γ(x) is in the
aforementioned enumeration, we also have x ∈ IΨΦ(qv). 
By the first part of Theorem 3.13, the results regarding LIND have to be some-
what similar to those for HBU. However, the Lindelo¨f theorem for the Baire space
behaves quite differently, as will be established in Section 4.1. Furthermore, while
HBU implies WKL, LIND does not by the following corollary.
Corollary 3.15. The system RCAω0 +LIND proves the same L2-sentences as RCA0.
Proof. By the proof of [48, Prop. 3.1], if for a sentence A ∈ Lω, the system RCAω0
proves A, then RCA0 proves [A]ECF, where ‘[ · ]ECF’ is a syntactic translation which
-intuitively- replaces any object of type 2 or higher by a code γ1 ∈ K0. Thus,
to establish the corollary, it suffices to show that [LIND]ECF is provable in RCA0.
However, LIND only involves objects of type 0 and 1, except for the leading quan-
tifier. Hence, [LIND]ECF is nothing more than LIND with ‘(∀Ψ1→1)’ replaced by
‘(∀γ1 ∈ K0)’. Thus, by enumerating γ(w) as in the proof of the theorem, we
immediately obtain a countable sub-cover, and [LIND]ECF is provable in RCA0. 
Finally, we discuss the Lindelo¨f lemma in the grand scheme of things, and asso-
ciated results to be proved in [71].
Remark 3.16. The following are equivalent over ZF by [35]: (i) R is a Lindelo¨f
space, and (ii) the axiom of countable choice (for subsets of R). This resonates with
the use of QF-AC0,1 in Theorem 3.14, but is not the entire story: we introduce a
weak and a strong version of LIND (and HBU) in [71] based on the 1895 and 1899
proofs of the Heine-Borel theorem by Borel ([9]) and Schoenflies ([86]). The weak
version of LIND (and HBU) is provable in ZΩ2 (and hence in ZF). This is possible as
the weak version only provides the existence of a countable sub-cover as in LIND,
while the strong version additionally identifies a sequence of reals which yield the
countable sub-cover, as in LIND2 via Φ
0→1.
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3.2.2. Other theorems. We discuss how the theorems in Remark 1.1 imply either
LIND or HBU, and hence have similar properties to the latter.
(1) The Besicovitsch and Vitali9 covering lemmas as in [1, §2] start from a
cover of open balls, one for each x ∈ E ⊂ Rn, and states the existence of a
countable sub-cover of E with nice properties, i.e. LIND follows. Note that
Vitali already (explicitly) discussed uncountable covers in [99, p. 236].
(2) The existence of Lebesgue numbers for any open cover is equivalent to HBU,
in the same way the countable case is equivalent to WKL0 ([32, Theo-
rem 5.5]). The same holds for the Banach-Alaoglu theorem; the equivalence
between the countable case and WKL0 is established in [11, p. 140].
(3) The principle NFP implies LIND by the proof of Theorem 3.14.
(4) The Heine-Young and Lusin-Young theorems from [104] are clearly refine-
ments of HBU, while the tile theorem [38, 104], and the latter’s generalisa-
tion due to Rademacher ([74, p. 190]) are clearly refinements of LIND.
(5) Basic properties of the gauge integral, like uniqueness and its extension of
the Riemann integral, are equivalent to HBU over the system ACAω0 , as
shown in Section 3.3. Note that ACAω0 is very weak compared to Z
Ω
2 , which
is in turn required to prove HBU by Theorem 3.1.
(6) In Section 3.4, we derive HBU from the following generalisation of the
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem: every net in the unit interval has a conver-
gent sub-net. Nets (aka Moore-Smith sequences) provide a generalisation
of the concept of sequences beyond countable index sets.
Finally, we discuss how some of the ‘countable covering theorems’, like the Lindelo¨f
and Vitali lemmas, from Remark 1.1 are used in mathematics.
Remark 3.17. The Cousin lemma is special because it deals with bounded sets (es-
sentially the unit interval), while the other covering theorems apply to unbounded
sets (e.g. Rn). Now, a cover of the latter is generally difficult to handle, but any
countable sub-cover ‘automatically’ has nice properties: e.g. the countable sub-
additivity of the Lebesgue measure. In fact, the proofs of Sard’s theorem and the
maximal theorem in [1], and of the Lebesgue density theorem in [89] are based on
this idea. In other words, the non-local character of some of the covering theorems
in Remark 1.1 is important for some real applications of these theorems.
Similarly, for properties which hold in the unit interval minus a measure zero
set, like the differentiation theorem for gauge integrals ([6, p. 80]), one uses the
Vitali covering theorem to provide a countable sub-cover in which the complement
of a finite sub-sub-cover has small length. Hence, one can neglect this complement
and the finite nature of the sub-sub-cover then makes the proof straightforward.
3.3. The gauge integral.
3.3.1. Introduction. We provide a brief introduction to the gauge integral (Sec-
tion 3.3.2) and establish that basic properties of this integral, like uniqueness and
the fact it extends the Riemann and Lebesgue integral, are equivalent to HBU
(Section 3.3.3) over the (relatively weak) system ACAω0 . The gauge integral is not
an isolated incident: the Henstock variational measure is a generalisation of the
9Not to be confused with the Vitali covering theorem ([6, p. 79]), which does follow from the
Vitali covering lemma via Banach’s proof from [63, p. 81]; we believe that the Vitali covering
theorem is weaker than HBU, but nonetheless requires full second-order arithmetic ZΩ2 to prove.
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Lebesgue outer measure (see [49, Ch. 5]), and its basic properties are equivalent
to HBU as well, as will be shown in future work. We address a possible criticism
that may be levelled at our results in Section 3.3.4. For the rest of this section, we
motivate the RM-study of the gauge integral.
As will become clear below, the gauge integral enjoys the conceptual simplicity of
the Riemann integral, but also has greater generality than the Lebesgue integral. In
fact, the gauge integral boasts the most general version of the fundamental theorem
of calculus (see Theorem 3.28) and is ‘maximally’ closed under improper integrals
(Hake’s theorem; see Theorem 3.23 for a special case). For these reasons, there
have been calls for (a somewhat stripped-down version of) the gauge integral to
replace the Riemann and Lebesgue integral (and the associated measure theory) in
the undergraduate curriculum ([3–5]). In a nutshell, the gauge integral can only be
called natural and mainstream from the point of view of mathematics.
Regarding the connection between physics and the gauge integral, Muldowney
has expressed the following opinion in a private communication.
There are a number of different approaches to the formalisation of
Feynman’s path integral. However, if one requires the formalisa-
tion to be close to Feynman’s original formulation, then the gauge
integral is really the only approach.
Arguments for this opinion, including major contributions to Rota’s program for
the Feyman integral, may be found in [60, §A.2]. Another argument in favour of
the gauge integral is that this formalism gives rise to so-called physical solutions,
i.e. in line with the observations from physics (see [64–66,73]). For instance, most
path integral formalisms somehow require the concept of imaginary time, while
the gauge integral provides a more natural framework based on real time. A major
problem with imaginary time is namely the lack of an arrow/direction of time ([42]),
where the latter is proscribed by thermodynamics (see also [16]).
Finally, another argument for the RM study of the gauge integral is as follows:
the study of the equivalent10 Denjoy integral in descriptive set theory in [100, §2]
makes essential use of fundamental results from [31,93], like Hake’s theorem for the
gauge integral (see Theorem 3.23). We note that the treatment in [100] assumes the
measurability of the integrand in the fundamental theorem of calculus, a condition
that flies in the face of the generality the gauge integral enjoys (see Theorem 3.28).
3.3.2. Introducing the gauge integral. The gauge integral is a generalisation of the
Lebesgue and (improper) Riemann integral; it was introduced by Denjoy (in a
different from) around 1912 and studied by Lusin, Perron, Henstock, and Kurzweil.
The exact definition is in Definition 3.18, which we intuitively motivate as follows.
A limitation of the ‘ε-δ-definition’ of the Riemann integral is that near a singu-
larity of a function f : [0, 1] → R, changes smaller than any fixed δ > 0 in x can
still result in huge changes in f(x), guaranteeing that the associated Riemann sums
vary (much) more than the given ε > 0. The gauge integral solves this problem by
replacing the fixed δ > 0 with a gauge function δ : R → R+; the latter can single out
those partitions with ‘many’ partition points near singularities to compensate for
the extreme behaviour there. Similarly, δ : R → R+ can single out partitions which
10The gauge integral is equivalent to the (much older) Denjoy integral; see [6, 31] for details.
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avoid ‘small’ sets whose contribution to the Riemann sums should be negligible. We
study 1√
x
and Dirichlet’s function in Example 3.19 after the following definition.
Definition 3.18. [Gauge integral]
(i) A gauge on I ≡ [0, 1] is any function δ : R → R+.
(ii) A sequence P := (t0, I0, . . . , tk, Ik) is a tagged partition of I, written ‘P ∈
tp’, if the ‘tag’ ti ∈ R is in the interval Ii for i ≤ k, and the Ii partition I.
(iii) If δ is a gauge on I and P = (ti, Ii)i≤k is a tagged partition of I, then P is
δ-fine if Ii ⊆ [ti − δ(ti), ti + δ(ti)] for i ≤ k.
(iv) For a tagged partition P = (ti, Ii)i≤k of I and any f , the Riemann sum
S(f, P ) is
∑n
i=0 f(ti)|Ii|, while the mesh ‖P‖ is maxi≤n |Ii|.
(v) A function f : I → R is Riemann integrable on I if there is A ∈ R such that
(∀ε >R 0)(∃δ >R 0)(∀P ∈ tp)(‖P‖ ≤R δ → |S(f, P )−A| <R ε).
(vi) A function f : I → R is gauge integrable on I if there is A ∈ R such that
(∀ε >R 0)(∃δ : R → R+)(∀P ∈ tp)(P is δ-fine → |S(f, P )−A| <R ε).
(vii) A gauge modulus for f is a function Φ : R → (R → R+) such that Φ(ε) is a
gauge as in the previous item for all ε >R 0.
The real A from items (v) and (vi) in Definition 3.18 is resp. called the Riemann
and gauge integral. We will always interpret
∫ b
a
f as a gauge integral, unless ex-
plicitly stated otherwise. We abbreviate ‘Riemann integration’ to ‘R-integration’,
and the same for related notions. The following examples are well-known.
Example 3.19 (Two examples). Let f be the function 1/
√
x for x > 0, and zero
otherwise. It is easy to show
∫ 1
0 f =R 2 using the gauge modulus δε(x) := εx
2 for
x > 0 and ε2 otherwise. Let g be constant 1 for x ∈ Q, and zero otherwise. It is
easy to show
∫ 1
0 g =R 0 using the gauge modulus δε(x) := 1 if x 6∈ Q and ε/2k+1 if
x equals the k-th rational (for some enumeration of the rationals fixed in advance).
Now, using the Axiom of Choice, a gauge integrable function always has a gauge
modulus, but this is not the case in weak systems like RCAω0 . However, to establish
the Cauchy criterion for gauge integrals as in Theorem 3.22, a gauge modulus is
essential. For this reason, we sometimes assume a gauge modulus when studying
the RM of the gauge integral in Section 3.3.3. Similar ‘constructive enrichments’
or ‘extra data’ exist in Friedman-Simpson RM, as established by Kohlenbach in
[47, §4]. Finally, the ‘standard’ proof of the fundamental theorem of calculus for
the gauge integral (see [6, 49, 59, 93] and Theorem 3.28) readily establishes the
existence of a gauge modulus in terms of other11 extra data.
3.3.3. Reverse Mathematics of the gauge integral. We show that basic properties
of the gauge integral are equivalent to HBU. We have based this development on
Bartle’s introductory monograph [6].
First of all, we show that HBU is equivalent to the uniqueness of the gauge
integral, and to the fact that the latter extends the R-integral. Note that the
names of the two items in the theorem are from [6, p. 13-14].
Theorem 3.20. Over ACAω0 , the following are equivalent to HBU:
11The proofs in [6,49,59,93] establish that a gauge modulus for the integral in the fundamental
theorem of calculus
∫ b
a
F ′ = F (b)− F (a) is simply any modulus of differentiability of F .
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(i) Uniqueness: If a function is gauge integrable on [0, 1], then the gauge inte-
gral is unique.
(ii) Consistency: If a function is R-integrable on [0, 1], then it is gauge inte-
grable there, and the two integrals are equal.
Proof. We prove HBU → (i) → (ii) → HBU, where only the first implication re-
quires (µ2). To prove that HBU implies Uniqueness, we assume the former and first
prove that for every δ : R → R+ there exists a δ-fine tagged partition. To this end,
apply HBU to ∪x∈I(x−δ(x), x+δ(x)) to obtain a finite sub-cover w := (y0, . . . , yk),
i.e. we have I ⊂ ∪x∈w(x− δ(x), x+ δ(x)). The latter cover is readily converted into
a tagged partition P0 := (zj , Ij)j≤l (with l ≤ k and zj ∈ w for j ≤ l) by remov-
ing overlapping segments and omitting redundant intervals ‘from left to right’. By
definition, zj ∈ Ij ⊂ (zj − δ(zj), zj + δ(zj)) for j ≤ l, i.e. P0 is δ-fine.
Now let f be gauge integrable on I and suppose we have for i = 1, 2 (Ai ∈ R) that:
(∀ε > 0)(∃δ1i : R → R+)(∀P ∈ tp)(P is δi-fine → |S(f, P )−Ai| < ε). (3.5)
Fix ε > 0 and δi : R → R+ in (3.5) for i = 1, 2. We define δ3 : R → R+ as
δ3(x) := min(δ1(x), δ2(x)). By definition, a partition which is δ3-fine, is also δi-
finite for i = 1, 2. Now let the partition P0 ∈ tp be δ3-fine, and derive the following:
|A1−A2| =R |A1−S(f, P0)+S(f, P0)−A2| ≤R |A1−S(f, P0)|+|S(f, P0)−A2| ≤R 2ε.
Hence, we must have A1 =R A2, and Uniqueness follows.
To prove that Uniqueness implies Consistency, note that ‘P is dδ-fine’ is equiv-
alent to ‘‖P‖ ≤ δ’ for the gauge dδ : R → R+ which is constant δ > 0. Rewriting
the definition of Riemann integration with this equivalence, we observe that an
R-integrable function f is also gauge integrable (with a constant gauge dδ for every
choice of ε > 0). The assumption Uniqueness then guarantees that the number A
is the only possible gauge integral for f on I, i.e. the two integrals are equal.
To prove that Consistency implies HBU, suppose the latter is false, i.e. there is
Ψ0 : R → R+ such that ∪x∈IIΨ0x does not have a finite sub-cover. Now let f : I → R
be R-integrable with R-integral A ∈ R. Define the gauge δ0 as δ0(x) := Ψ0(x) and
note that for any P ∈ tp, we have that P is not δ0-fine, as ∪x∈IIΨ0x would otherwise
have a finite sub-cover (provided by the tags of P ). Hence, the following statement
is vacuously true, as the underlined part is false:
(∀ε > 0)(∀P ∈ tp)(P is δ0-fine → |S(f, P )− (A+ 1)| < ε). (3.6)
However, (3.6) implies that f is gauge integrable with gauge δ0 and gauge integral
A+1, i.e. Consistency is false as the Riemann and gauge integrals of f differ. Note
that δ0 also provides a gauge modulus by (3.6) in case ¬HBU. 
By the above, the role of HBU in making the gauge integral well-behaved, con-
sists in avoiding (3.5) and (3.6) being vacuously true due to the absence of δi-fine
partitions (for i = 0, 1, 2). Thus, the Cousin lemma is called Fineness theorem
in [6]. As will become clear below, this is the sole role of HBU in this context.
Nonetheless, HBU features in the RM of topology and uniform theorems in [71,83],
and Remark 3.27 suggest an important role for the special fan functional, a realiser
for HBU, in gauge integration.
In passing, we discuss the question if ACAω0 in the previous (and subsequent)
theorem can be weakened to RCAω0 . In our opinion, this weakening would not be
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spectacular, given that HBU requires ZΩ2 for a proof, as established above. Further-
more, even very basic properties of the gauge integral require ACAω0 , as follows.
Example 3.21 (Splitting the domain). As it turns out, proving
∫ 1
0 f =R
∫ x
0 f+
∫ 1
x
f
for 0 <R x <R 1 in general seems to require a discontinuous gauge. Indeed, if for
ε > 0 the functions δ1, δ2 are gauges for the right-hand side of the equation, a gauge
for the left-hand side is as follows ([6, p. 45]):
δ3(y) :=


min(δ1(y),
1
2 (x− y)) y ∈ [0, x)
min(δ1(x), δ2(x)) y =R x
min(δ2(y),
1
2 (y − x)) y ∈ (x, 1]
(3.7)
The function δ3 is discontinuous in general, but can be defined in ACA
ω
0 .
Secondly, we prove the Cauchy criterion for gauge integrals, as this theorem is
needed below. Our proof is based on [6, p. 40] and illuminates the role of Θ.
Theorem 3.22 (ACAω0 +HBU+QF-AC
2,1; Cauchy criterion). A function f : I → R
is gauge integrable with a modulus if and only if there is Φ : R+ → (R → R+) with
(∀ε >R 0)(∀P,Q ∈ tp)(P,Q are Φ(ε)-fine → |S(f, P )− S(f,Q)| <R ε). (3.8)
Proof. The forward implication follows by considering a gauge modulus Φ for f and
|S(f, P )−S(f,Q)| = |S(f, P )−A+A−S(f,Q)| ≤ |S(f, P )−A|+ |A−S(f,Q)| ≤ ε
where P,Q are Φ(ε/2)-fine and A is the gauge integral of f over I. For the reverse
implication let Φ be as in (3.8); we need to find the real A from the definition of
gauge integration. This real A can be obtained as the limit of the sequence S(f,Qn)
where Qn is a Φ(
1
2n )-fine partition. Now, these partitions Qn can in turn be defined
by applying the functional Ω from Theorem 3.3 to the canonical cover associated to
Φ( 12n ) and using Feferman’s µ to convert the resulting finite sub-cover to a suitable
partition. Finally, (3.8) guarantees that the sequence S(f,Qn) is Cauchy, while
ACA0 proves that a Cauchy sequence has a limit by [91, III.2.2]. 
The previous proof explains the need for a gauge modulus: the latter is essential
in ‘reconstructing’ the gauge integral A as the limit in the proof, if A is not given.
Thirdly, we show that HBU is equivalent to the fact that the gauge integral en-
compasses the improper R-integral. The latter is a (usual) R-integral
∫ b
a
f(x)d(x)
where additionally a limit operation like lima→0 or limb→∞ is applied. This method
allows one to consider unbounded domains or use singularities as end points; as sug-
gested by its name, an improper R-integral is (generally) not an actual R-integral.
Now, Hake’s theorem ([6, p. 195]) implies that improper R-integrals (and the same
for improper gauge integrals) are automatically gauge integrals. Thus, Hake’s theo-
rem implies that the gauge integral is (maximally) closed under improper integrals.
We consider special cases of Hake’s theorem, including item (iii) below which
does mention gauge integrability but does not mention gauge integrals or their
uniqueness. As a result, it is fair to say that the following equivalences are not
(only) based on the uniqueness of the gauge integral. Note that Hake’s theorem in
general (see [6, §12 and §16]) comes with no restrictions.
Theorem 3.23. Over ACAω0 + QF-AC
2,1, the following are equivalent to HBU:
(i) There exists a function which is not gauge integrable with a modulus.
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(ii) (Hake) If f is gauge integrable on I with a modulus and R-integrable on
[x, 1] for x >R 0, then the limit of R-integrals limx→0+
∫ 1
x
f is
∫ 1
0 f .
(iii) (weak Hake) If f is gauge integrable with a modulus on I and R-integrable
on [x, 1] for x >R 0, then the limit of R-integrals limx→0+
∫ 1
x
f exists.
Proof. We shall prove HBU → (ii) → (iii) → (i) → HBU. Note that the second
implication is trivial. Now assume item (iii) and consider the function g : I → R
which is 0 if x =R 0, and
1
x
otherwise. This function exists in ACAω0 by [48,
Prop. 3.12]. By the development of integration theory in [91, IV.2], the R-integral∫ 1
x
g exists for x > 0 and is readily seen to equal ln(x), the natural logarithm.
However, the limit x → 0+ of this function is −∞. Thus, the limit limx→0+
∫ 1
x
g
does not exist, and by the contraposition of weak Hake’s theorem, we conclude that
g is not gauge integrable with a modulus on I, i.e. item (i) follows.
The implication (i)→ HBU follows from the proof of Theorem 3.20: in the last
part of the latter proof, it is shown that ¬HBU allows us to define a gauge δ0 for
which there are no δ0-fine partitions. Hence, the underlined part in (3.6) is false,
making the formula trivially true for any f and A, i.e. every function is gauge
integrable (with a modulus). Contraposition now yields the desired implication.
Finally, we prove item (ii) in ACAω0 + HBU + QF-AC
2,1 based on the proof
in [6, p. 195]. In a nutshell, the latter uses the Saks-Henstock lemma to prove
that the indefinite integral F (x) :=
∫ 1
x
f is (ε-δ-)continuous in x on I. Hence
limx→0+ F (x) =R F (0), which is exactly as required for item (ii). First of all,
the Saks-Henstock lemma intuitively states that if one considers a sub-partition
of a δ-fine partition, one inherets all the ‘nice’ properties of the original partition.
The proof of this lemma is a straight-forward ‘epsilon-delta’ argument, with one
subtlety: the Cauchy criterion (as is Theorem 3.22) for gauge integrals requires
a gauge modulus, which we (therefore) assumed in item (ii). The proof that the
Saks-Henstock lemma yields the continuity of F (x) :=
∫ 1
x
f is also a straight-forward
‘epsilon-delta’ argument. 
The gauge integral is a proper extension of the Lebesgue and (improper) Riemann
integral. As it turns out, this claim is of considerable logical strength, as follows.
Corollary 3.24 (RCAω0 +WKL+QF-AC
2,1). The below combination yields ATR0:
(i) There exists a function that is not gauge integrable with a modulus.
(ii) There exists a function that is not Riemann integrable, but gauge integrable.
Proof. By [48, Prop. 3.7], ¬(∃2) implies that all F : R → R are continuous, and
hence uniformly continuous on [0, 1] by WKL and [47, Prop. 4.10]. Hence, any
gauge integrable function is also Riemann integrable, as the gauge has an upper
bound on [0, 1]. By contraposition, item (ii) from the theorem implies (∃2). By
Theorem 3.23, item (i) now yields HBU. The combination HBU+ (∃2) yields ATR0
by [69, Cor. 6.7] and Theorem 3.3. 
Fourth, we show that HBU is equivalent to the fact that the gauge integral
is a proper extension of the Lebesgue integral. In fact, f : [0, 1] → R is Lebesgue
integrable if and only if |f |, f are gauge integrable ([6, §7, p. 102]). We use the latter
variant as introducing the Lebesgue integral is beyond the scope of this paper.
Theorem 3.25. Over ACAω0 , HBU is equivalent to the following statement: There
exists a function κ : I → R which is gauge integrable with a modulus but |κ| is not.
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Proof. The reverse implication is immediate by Theorem 3.23. For the forward
implication, define ak := 1− 12k and κ(x) := (−1)k+1 2
k
k
if x ∈ [ak−1, ak) (k0 ≥ 1),
and 0 otherwise. Then for x >R 0, the area between the horizontal axis and the
graph of |κ| on [0, x] is just a finite collection of (bounded) rectangles, i.e. |κ| is
definitely R-integrable on [0, x] for x < 1. In particular, if x ≥R 1− 12k , there are at
least k rectangles to the left of x; the first has base 1/2 and area 1, the second one
base 1/4 and area 1/2, . . . , the k-th one has base 1/2k and area 1/k. The R-integral∫ x
0
|κ| is thus at least ∑ki=1 1i . The limit of the latter is the divergent harmonic
series, and item (iii) from Theorem 3.23 yields that |κ| is not gauge integrable on
I with a modulus. To prove that κ is gauge integrable on I, note that (3.7) allows
us to ‘piece together’ gauges. The following gauge modulus is based on that idea:
δε(x) :=


d(x,E) x ∈ [0, 1] \ E
ε
4(k+1)
x =R ak
2−m(ε) x =R 1
,
where E is the set consisting of the real 1 and all ak, and where m(ε) is such that
m(ε) ≥ 1
ε
and the tail of the alternating harmonic series satisfies |∑∞k=n −1k+1k | ≤ ε
for n ≥ m(ε). We leave it as an exercise that this gauge can be defined in ACAω0 .
The proof that δε is a gauge for κ is completely straightforward and elementary, but
somewhat long and tedious. Hence, we omit this proof and refer to [6, p. 35]. 
Example 3.21 notwithstanding, we now prove that the base theory in Theo-
rem 3.20 can be weakened to weak Ko¨nig’s lemma.
Corollary 3.26. The equivalences in Theorem 3.20 can be proved in RCAω0 +WKL.
Proof. As noted in the proof, only HBU → (i) in Theorem 3.20 requires (µ2). To
prove this implication in RCAω0 + WKL, note that in case (µ
2), we may use the
proof of Theorem 3.20. In case of ¬(µ2), all R → R-functions are continuous by
[48, Prop.3˜.12]. Thanks to WKL, all R → R-functions are uniformly continuous on
[0, 1] by [47, Prop. 4.10]. Hence, the definition of gauge integral reduces to that
of Riemann integral, and the latter is even unique in RCA0. The law of excluded
middle as in (µ2) ∨ ¬(µ2) now finishes the proof. 
Fifth, we discuss in what sense we may evaluate (general) gauge integrals.
Remark 3.27 (Computing integrals). In the case of the R-integral, a modulus (of
R-integration) computes a δ > 0 in terms of any ε > 0 as in Definition 3.18. Hence,
if Pn is the equidistant partition of I with mesh 1/2
n, we know that S(Pn, f) con-
verges to the R-integral of f on I, and the modulus provides a rate of convergence.
For the gauge integral, there is no analogue of the equidistant partition: even given
a gauge modulus δ(ε, x), we need to find, say for every ε > 0, a δ(ε, ·)-fine partition
Qε; only then can we consider the limit of S(Qε, f) for ε → 0, which converges
to the gauge integral of f on I as in Theorem 3.22. To find such a partition, the
only option (we can imagine) is to consider ∪x∈I(x− δ(ε, x), x+ δ(ε, x)) and apply
the realiser Ω for HBU as in (3.1) to obtain a finite sub-cover. The latter can be
modified using µ2 into a δ(ε, ·)-fine partition.
Sixth, two of the redeeming features of the gauge integral are its simplicity
(via the similarity to the Riemann integral) and its generality. Indeed, the gauge
integral boasts the most general version of the fundamental theorem of calculus and
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is ‘maximally’ closed under improper integrals via Hake’s theorem. We now consider
the former theorem, which indeed only requires a modulus of differentiability.
Theorem 3.28 (RCAω0 + HBU). Let f : R → R be differentiable with a modulus.
Then
∫ b
a
f ′ = f(b)− f(a), and the latter modulus provides a gauge modulus.
Proof. The textbook proof (see e.g. [6, p. 58]) amounts to little more than manip-
ulation of definitions and of course goes through in RCAω0 + HBU. 
It goes without saying that restricting the fundamental theorem of calculus to
e.g. measurable functions (as is done in e.g. [100]) flies in the face of the generality
the gauge integral enjoys.
Finally, we discuss some foundational implications of the above results.
Remark 3.29. Feferman discusses in [23, V] what fragments of mathematics are
necessary for the development of physics. He claims that the logical system W,
a conservative extension of Peano arithmetic, suffices for this purpose. Feferman
also discusses two purported (exotic) counterexamples involving non-measurable
sets and non-separable spaces; he shows that these are rather fringe in physics, if
part of the latter at all.
However, by contrast, Feynman’s path integral and the associated diagrammatic
approach are central to large parts of modern physics. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the gauge integral is unique in that it provides a formalisation (of part) of
Feynman’s formalism that remains close to Feyman’s development and ideas (based
on Riemann sums), as discussed in [60, §A.2] and [13, Ch. 10]. Moreover, the gauge
integral avoids the non-physical concept of imaginary time ([64–66, 73]). Hence, if
one requires that a mathematical formalisation remains close to (the original treat-
ment in) physics, then there seems to be no choice other than the gauge integral
for the formalisation of Feynman’s path integral. As established in this section, the
basic development of the gauge integral requires HBU, and the latter is not provable
in any Π1k-CA
ω
0 , a system much stronger than W. Thus, Feferman’s above claim
seems incorrect, assuming the aforementioned caveat concerning formalisations.
3.3.4. Extra data and the gauge integral. We address a possible criticism that may
be levelled at the results in the previous section. In particular, it is a natural
question (from the pov of computability theory) whether adding ‘extra data’ to the
definition of the gauge integral leads to an integration theory in weaker systems.
Before we answer this question, we emphasise that the definition of the gauge
integral as in Definition 3.18 is taken verbatim from the literature, except the final
item, the existence of which is however taken for granted throughout the literature.
Moreover, the first step in the development of the gauge integral is always the use
of Cousin’s lemma (or open-cover compactness) to show that the definition of the
gauge integral ‘makes sense’. For instance, Swartz writes the following.
In order for [the definition of the gauge integral] to make sense,
there is one matter that needs to be addressed. We must show that
every gauge γ has at least one γ-fine tagged partition. ([93, p. 6])
The next step is then always to show that the gauge integral is unique, and this
proof is based on the existence of γ-fine partitions (see again [93, p. 6]). The same
approach may be found in [6, 59]. Thus, the previous section deals with ‘actual
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mathematics’ or ‘theorems as they stand’, i.e. we have avoided the use of ‘extra
data’ to the maximal extent possible, as mandated by Simpson in [91, I.8.9].
Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons, one may wish to ‘constructivise’ the def-
inition of the gauge integral, i.e. build in extra data to guarantee a development
in weaker systems (than ZΩ2 ). We consider one possible/obvious such ‘richer’ def-
inition, and show that one still readily obtains HBU. Now, the latter is needed in
the proof of Theorem 3.20 to guarantee the existence of δ-fine partitions for arbi-
trary gauges δ. Hence, it seems that the most obvious piece of ‘extra data’ is the
requirement that such a partition is given together with the gauge, as follows.
Definition 3.30. A function f : I → R is strongly gauge integrable on I if there is
A ∈ R such that for all ε > 0, there is a gauge δ : R → R+ such that
(∀P ∈ tp)(P is δ-fine → |S(f, P )−A| <R ε) ∧ (∃Q ∈ tp)(Q is δ-fine). (3.9)
The notion of strong gauge modulus is defined similarly.
Note that the second conjunct in (3.9) guarantees that the antecedent in the
first conjunct of (3.9) cannot be vacuously true. One may cherish the hope that
this ‘extra data’ obviates the use of HBU, but we now show that the latter is still
readily obtained from basic properties of the gauge integral.
To this end, we now turn to the fundamental theorem of calculus for the gauge
integral; this is the most general formulation of the well-known phenomenon that
integration and differentiation cancel out. As noted above, the ‘standard’ proof
of the fundamental theorem of calculus in [6, p. 58], [49, p. 6], [59, Ch. 2.4], and
[93, Ch. 1] also establishes that a gauge modulus for the integral in
∫ b
a
F ′ = F (b)−
F (a) is simply any modulus of differentiability of F ; this modulus provides the
‘delta’ in terms of the ‘epsilon’ and the point at which the derivative is taken.
Similar constructs and results exist12 in e.g. Bishop’s constructive analysis, and
other computational approaches to mathematics.
Theorem 3.31 (FTCstrong). If F : R → R is differentiable with a modulus on I and
derivative F ′, then the latter is strongly gauge integrable with the same modulus
and we have F (1)− F (0) =R
∫ 1
0
F ′.
Theorem 3.32. The system RCAω0 proves HBU↔ FTCstrong.
Proof. The forward direction follows by the usual proof from the literature; in a
nutshell, for the modulus of differentiability λx.δε(x) of F , any δε-fine partition
P satisfies |F (1) − F (0) − S(F ′, P )| < ε using standard calculus tricks, known as
‘telescoping sums’ and the ‘straddle lemma’ (see e.g. [6, p. 57-58]). Note that HBU
implies the equivalence between ‘normal’ and strong gauge integrability.
For the reverse direction, fix Ψ : R → R+ and pick any function F : R → R with
derivative F ′ and modulus of differentiability G : R2 → R. Then define G0(x, ε) as
the minimum of G(x, ε) and Ψ(x). Clearly, G0 is also a modulus of differentiability
for F , and FTCstrong implies that there is a G0-fine partition of the unit interval,
immediately yielding a finite sub-cover for the canonical cover associated to Ψ. In
this way, HBU follows, and we are done. 
12As detailed in [8], a modulus function is part and parcel of the definition of a (uniformly)
continuous and differentiable functions. Any modulus of uniform continuity is also a modulus of
Riemann integrability, as can be gleaned from [8, p. 47].
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While the previous theorem is not particularly deep, it does suggest that a
constructive treatment of the gauge integral is not entirely trivial.
3.4. Nets and compactness. We show that the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem for
nets implies HBU. More results of this nature, e.g. for the monotone convergence
theorem and the Dini and Arzela` theorems, may be found in [85].
The move to more and and more abstract mathematics can be quite concrete
and specific: Moore presented a framework called General Analysis at the 1908
ICM in Rome ([55]) that was to be a ‘unifying abstract theory’ for various parts
of analysis. For instance, Moore’s framework captures various limit notions in one
abstract concept ([56]). This theory also included a generalisation of the concept
of sequence beyond countable index sets, nowadays called nets or Moore-Smith
sequences. These were first described in [57] and formally introduced by Moore
and his student Smith in [58]. In this section, we derive HBU from the Bolzano-
Weierstrass theorem for nets in [0, 1] and indexed by Baire space. Since nets are a
generalisation of sequences, the latter theorem thus provides a ‘unified’ notion of
compactness, implying both sequential and open-cover compactness.
We first need the following standard definition (see e.g. [43, Ch. 2])
Definition 3.33. [Nets] A set D 6= ∅ with a binary relation ‘’ is directed if
(a) The relation  is transitive, i.e. (∀x, y, z ∈ D)([x  y ∧ y  z]→ x  z).
(b) The relation  is reflexive, i.e. (∀x ∈ D)(x  x).
(c) For x, y ∈ D, there is z ∈ D such that x  z ∧ y  z.
For such (D,) and topological space X , any mapping xd : D → X is a net in X .
The relation ‘’ is often not mentioned together with the net; we also write
d1, . . . , dk  d as short for (∀i ≤ k)(di  d).
Definition 3.34. [Convergence of nets] If xd is a net in X , we say that xd converges
to the limit limd xd = y ∈ X if for every neighbourhood U of y, there is d ∈ D such
that for all e  d, xe ∈ U .
Definition 3.35. [Sub-nets] A sub-net of a net xd with directed set (D,D), is a
net yb with directed set (B,B) such that there is a function φ : B → D such that:
(a) the function φ satisfies yb = xφ(b),
(b) (∀d ∈ D)(∃b0 ∈ B)(∀b B b0)(φ(b) D d).
In this section, we only study directed sets that are subsets of Baire space, i.e.
as given by Definition 3.36. Similarly, we only study nets xd : D → R where D is
a subset of Baire space. Thus, a net xd in R is just a type 1 → 1 functional with
extra structure on its domain D provided by ‘’ as in Definition 3.36.
Definition 3.36. [RCAω0 ] A ‘subset D of N
N’ is given by its characteristic function
F 2D ≤2 1, i.e. we write ‘f ∈ D’ for FD(f) = 1 for any f ∈ NN. A ‘binary relation 
on a subset D of NN’ is given by the associated characteristic function G
(1×1)→0
 ,
i.e. we write ‘f  g’ for G(f, g) = 1 and any f, g ∈ D. Assuming extensionality
on the reals as in item (v) of Definition 2.5, we obtain characteristic functions that
represent subsets of R and relations thereon. Using pairing functions, it is clear we
can also represent sets of finite sequences (of reals), and relations thereon.
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A basic result is that a topological space X is compact if and only if every net
in X has a convergent sub-net. Let BWnet be the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem for
nets, i.e. the statement that every net in the unit interval has a convergent sub-net,
as can be found in e.g. [78, p. 98]. Note that BWnet is assumed to be restricted as
in Definition 3.36. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.37. The system RCAω0 + BWnet proves HBU.
Proof. Note that BWnet implies the monotone convergence theorem, as sequences
are clearly nets. Hence, we have access to ACA0 by [91, III.2.2]. Now, in case ¬(∃2),
all functions on R are continuous by [48, Prop. 3.12], and HBU reduces to WKL by
[47, §4]. We now prove HBU in case (∃2), which finishes the proof using the law of
excluded middle. Thus, suppose ¬HBU and fix some Ψ : I → R+ for which ∪x∈IIΨx
does not have a finite sub-cover. Let D be the set of all finite sequences of reals
in the unit interval, and define ‘v D w’ for w, v ∈ D if ∪i<|v|Iψv(i) ⊆ ∪i<|w|Iψw(i),
i.e. the set generated by w includes the set generated by v. Note that (∃2) suffices
to define D. Clearly, the latter is transitive and reflexiv, also satisfies item (c) in
Definition 3.33. To define a net, consider
(∀w1∗ ∈ [0, 1])(∃q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])(q 6∈ ∪i<|w|IΨw(i)), (3.10)
which again holds by assumption. Note that the underlined formula in (3.10) is
decidable thanks to (∃2). Applying QF-AC1,0 to (3.10), we obtain a net xw in [0, 1],
which has a convergent (say to z0 ∈ I) sub-net yb = xφ(b) for some directed set
(B,B) and φ : B → D, by BWnet. By definition, the neighbourhood U0 = IΨz0
contains all yb for b B b1 for some b1 ∈ B. However, taking d = 〈z0〉 in the second
item in Definition 3.35, there is also b0 ∈ B such that (∀b B b0)(φ(b) D 〈z0〉). By
the definition of ‘B’, φ(b) is hence such that ∪i<|φ(b)|IΨφ(b)(i) contains U0, for any
b B b0. Now use item (c) from Definition 3.33 to find b2 ∈ B satisfying b2 B b0
and b2 B b1. Hence, yb2 = xφ(b2) is in U0, but ∪i<|φ(b2)|IΨφ(b2)(i) also contains U0,
i.e. xφ(b2) must be outside of U0 by the definition of xw, a contradiction. In this
way, we obtain HBU in case (∃2), and we are done. 
Finally, we note that Moore and Smith already proved versions of the Bolzano-
Weierstrass, Dini, and Arzela` theorem in [58].
4. Main results II
4.1. Jumping to the superjump. We show that the Lindelo¨f lemma for Baire
space and Feferman’s µ2 together give rise to the Suslin functional S and the su-
perjump S. We introduce the latter in Section 4.1.1, while the Lindelo¨f lemma for
Baire space and the associated functional Ξ (computing the countable sub-cover)
are introduced in Section 4.1.2. The following results are established below.
(1) The superjump S is computable in the special fan functional Θ and the
Suslin functional S (Section 4.1.1).
(2) The Suslin functional S is (uniformly) computable in Feferman’s µ and
the functional Ξ which computes the countable sub-cover from the Lindelo¨f
lemma for Baire space (Section 4.1.2).
As a consequence, the combination of Feferman’s µ and any such Ξ computes the
superjump S. We recall the fact that the special fan functional Θ is not unique,
and neither is ‘the’ aforementioned functional Ξ.
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4.1.1. Computing the superjump. We show that the combination of the Suslin func-
tional S and the special fan functional Θ computes the superjump. The latter cor-
responds to the Halting problem for computability on type two inputs. Indeed, the
superjump S3 was introduced in [30] by Gandy (essentially) as follows:
S(F 2, e0) :=
{
0 if {e}(F ) terminates
1 otherwise
, (S3)
where the formula ‘{e}(F ) terminates’ is a Π11-formula defined by Kleene’s S1-S9.
As to its history, Harrington has proved that the first ordinal not computable in
S is the first recursively Mahlo ordinal ([33]). In turn, the latter ordinal appears
in the study of constructive set and type theory and the associated proof theory
([75–77]). In particular, {R ⊆ N : R is computable from S} is the smallest β-
model of ∆12-CA0 + (M), where (M) expresses that every true Π
1
3-sentence with
parameters already holds in a β-model of ∆12-comprehension ([77]). As discussed
in Remark 4.18, S lives far outside of predicative mathematics.
Theorem 4.1. The superjump S is computable in any Θ satisfying SCF(Θ) and
the Suslin functional S.
Proof. We first provide a sketch of the proof as follows. Recall that if σ is a finite
binary sequence, then [σ] is the set of total binary extensions of σ.
(1) Given F 2, let αF (e) = {e}(F, e) whenever the value is in {0, 1}, and let XF
be the set of total binary extensions of αF .
(2) Compute GF from F and S with the properties
i) if f 6∈ X , then GF (f) > 0
ii) if GF (f) > 0, then [f¯GF (f)] does not intersect XF
iii) for f ∈ XF , GF (f) = 0.
(3) Show that S(F ) is uniformly computable in S and f ∈ XF .
(4) Since Θ(GF ) has to intersect XF , and we can decide where, S(F ) is com-
putable in Θ and S, uniformly in F .
We work out the proof in full detail below. 
We will now list some basic lemmas needed for the detailed proof of Theorem 4.1.
We first define an important concept relating to S1-S9 computability with type two
inputs. Its importance stems from the fact that it is independent of the choice of
input functional F 2, as follows.
Lemma 4.2. There is a primitive recursive ξ of type level 1, independent of
the choice of F 2, such that {ξ(e,~a)}(F, ξ(e,~a)) is resp. (0, 1, undefined) whenever
{e}(F,~a) is resp. (= 0, > 0, undefined).
Lemma 4.3. There is a primitive recursive function η such that for all e,~a, F
{η(e)}(F,~a) ≃ {e}(F,~a) ·−1,
where ‘≃’ means that both sides are undefined or both sides are defined and equal.
Definition 4.4. Let f be a total binary function. By an application of the recursion
theorem for Turing computations in oracles we define
[e]f (~a) :=
{
0 if f(ξ(e,~a)) = 0
1 + [η(e)]f (~a) if f(ξ(e,~a)) = 1
.
Clearly, if the recursion goes on forever, [e]f (~a) will be undefined.
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Intuitively speaking and from the outside, [·]f may look like an indexing of some
partial functions computable in some functional of type 2, but to what extent this
is correct, will depend on the choice of f .
We will now use F to define a relation, mimicking the subcomputation relation
relative to F , as far as possible. As a cheap trick, we will let an alleged computation
tuple be a subcomputation of its own if it is clear that something is wrong, in order
to force such objects into the non-well-founded part of the relation.
Definition 4.5. Given f , we let Ωf be the set of triples (e,~a, b) such that [e]f (~a) =
b. Given F as well, define the relation ‘’ (short for f,F ) on Ωf as follows:
• If e is not a Kleene index for any of S1-S9, we put (e,~a, b)  (e,~a, b).
• If e is an index for an initial computation, we let (e,~a, b) be a leaf in our
ordering if {e}(F,~a) = b, and its own sub-node otherwise. This decision
will be independent of the choice of the functional F .
• We treat the case S4. The rest of the cases, except S8, are similar or void
(e.g. S6). If e is an index for composition {e}(F,~a) = {e1}({e2}(~a),~a), c is
given and there is a b such that [e2]f (~a) = b, [e1]f (b,~a) = c and [e]f (~a) = c,
then we define (e2,~a, b)  (e,~a, c) and (e1, b,~a, c)  (e,~a, c). If there is no
such b , we let (e,~a, c)  (e,~a, c).
• For the case S8, if we have {e}(F,~a) = F (λb.{d}(F, b,~a)), we let (e,~a, c) 
(e,~a, c) unless h(b) = [d]f (b,~a) is a total function and F (h) = c. In the
latter case, we let (d, b,~a, h(b))  (e,~a, c) for all b.
The intuitive explanation of Definition 4.5 is as follows: The set of finite se-
quences (e,~a, b) such that {e}(F,~a) = b is defined by a strictly positive inductive
definition, so whenever a sequence is added to the set it is either initial or there is
a unique set of other sequences in the set causing that we accept the one chosen.
These are called immediate predecessors in the computation tree. The relation ‘’
is defined on the set of (e,~a, b) where [e]f(~a) = b as the immediate predecessor
relation wherever the inductive definition of the computation tree is locally correct.
Lemma 4.6. For any function f , the well-founded segment of 〈Ωf ,f,F 〉 is an
initial segment of the full computation relation of F .
Proof. This is trivial by induction over this well-founded segment. 
Lemma 4.7. For any f ∈ XF , if {e}(F,~a) = b, then [e]f (~a) = b.
Proof. We prove this by induction on b. If b = 0, then {ξ(e,~a)}(F, ξ(e,~a)) = 0, so
f(ξ(e,~a)) = 0 = [e]f (~a). If b > 0, we use the induction hypothesis on b
·−1 for the
index η(e) and the fact that [e]f (~a) = b in this case. 
Lemma 4.8. If f ∈ XF and {e}(F,~a) = b, then (e,~a, b) is in the f,F -well-founded
part of Ωf . Moreover, this well-founded part is exactly the full tree of terminating
computations {e}(F,~a) = b relative to F .
Proof. That the computation tree for computations relative to F is contained in
the well-founded part is proved by induction over the tree of real computations.
Now, if the well-founded part of 〈Ωf ,f,F 〉 contains more, we may consider one
alleged computation (e,~a, b) in Ωf that is not a real F -computation, but that is
minimal as such. Since it is in the well-founded part, (e,~a, b) is locally correct, so
either it is an initial computation or it has subcomputations that are real (because
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we consider a minimal one). Being locally correct, we see in each case that (e,~a, b)
must be genuine after all. 
Lemma 4.9. If f ∈ XF , then S(F ) is uniformly computable in f , F and S.
Proof. From the data, we can compute the characteristic function of {(e,~a, b) |
{e}(~a) = b}, and S(F ) is primitive recursive in this characteristic function. 
We are now ready to provide the proof of Theorem 4.1 as follows.
Proof. We see from Lemma 4.6 that if the f,F -well-founded part of Ωf is closed
under the Kleene schemes S1-S9 relative to F , then S(F ) is computable in f , F
and S as above. We need S to isolate the well-founded part, and (only) F and µ2
to decide if we have the closure.
Now, assume that f is such that the f,F -well-founded part is not S1-S9-closed.
Let {e}(F,~a) = b be a computation of minimal rank such that we do not have
[e]f(~a) = b. By induction on b we see that there must be an index d such that
{d}(F, d) ∈ {0, 1} and {d}(F, d) 6= f(d). If we then put GF (f) := d + 1 we have
ensured that there will be no extension of fGF (f) in XF . Using Gandy selection
for F, µ and f , we can trivially find a d with this property from the well-founded
part of Ωf . In order to show that GF is definable from S, F, µ via a term in Go¨del’s
T , we proceed as follows:
Given the well-founded partW of ΩF , we may arithmetically decide
if it respects S1-S9. If it does not, let Γ be the, arithmetically in
F , inductive definition of the computation tuples for computing
relative to F , and by one application of µ on Γ(W ) \W , we may
find the (e,~a, b) that leads us to the d we need.
In light of the previous, we put GF (f) := 0 if the f,F -well-founded part of Ωf is a
fixed point of the inductive definition of computations relative to F , while we put
GF (f) := d + 1 for the d selected as above otherwise. Thus, Θ(GF ) must contain
a function from which, together with F and S, we can compute S(F ). 
Some of the methods in this proof have been expanded in [68, 71], where even
sharper results are obtained.
4.1.2. Computing the Suslin functional. We show that the Suslin functional S can
be computed by the combination of Feferman’s µ and the functional Ξ arising from
the Lindelo¨f lemma for NN. Furthermore, the Lindelo¨f lemma for NN (not involving
Ξ) and the axiom (µ2) are seen to imply Π11-CA0.
Regarding the Lindeo¨f lemma, we recall that Lindelo¨f already proved that Eu-
clidean space is hereditarily Lindelo¨f in [50] around 1903. Now, the latter hereditary
property implies that NN has the Lindelo¨f property, since NN is homeomorphic to
the irrationals in [0, 1] using continued fractions expansion. Thus, for any Ψ2, the
corresponding ‘canonical cover’ of NN is ∪f∈NN
[
fΨ(f)
]
where [σ0
∗
] is the set of all
extensions in NN of σ. By the Lindelo¨f lemma for NN, there is a sequence f0→1(·)
such that the set of ∪i∈N[f¯iΨ(fi)] still covers NN, i.e.
(∀Ψ2)(∃f0→1(·) )(∀g1)(∃n0)(g ∈
[
fnΨ(fn)
]
). (LIND4)
Similar to the specification SCF(Θ) for the special fan functional Θ, we introduce
the following specification based on LIND4. As for the former specification, the
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functional Ξ2→(0→1) satisfying LIN(Ξ) is not unique.
(∀Ψ2)(∀g1)(∃n0)(g ∈ [Ξ(Ψ)(n)Ψ(Ξ(Ψ)(n))]). (LIN(Ξ))
As for the special fan functional Θ in Theorem 3.3, the existence of Ξ as in LIN(Ξ)
amounts to the Lindelo¨f lemma LIND4 itself.
Theorem 4.10. The system Π11-CA
ω
0 + QF-AC
2,1 proves LIND4 ↔ (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ).
Proof. We only need to prove the forward direction. We rephrase LIND4 to
(∀G2)(∃f0→1(·) )
[
(∀g1)(∃n0)(g ∈ [f+n fn(0)]) ∧ (∀m0)(fm(0) = G(f+m))], (4.1)
where f+(k) = f(k + 1). Using the Suslin functional S and µ we see that the part
of (4.1) inside the (outermost) square brackets can be viewed as quantifier-free, and
thus the existence of Ξ follows from QF-AC2,1. 
For a (much) weaker base theory, we need the following functional from [69, 71].
(∃κ30 ≤3 1)(∀Y 2)
[
κ0(Y ) = 0↔ (∃f ∈ C)Y (f) = 0
]
. (κ30)
Here, RCAω0 +WKL+ (κ
3
0) +QF-AC
0,1 is conservative up to language13 over WKL0
by [48, Prop. 3.15], while RCAω0 proves that [(∃2)+(κ30)]↔ (∃3) by [69, Rem. 6.13].
Corollary 4.11. The system RCAω0 +(κ
3
0)+QF-AC
2,1 proves LIND4 ↔ (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ).
Proof. Consider (∃2) ∨ ¬(∃2) and note that ∃3 follows in the former case, while all
functions on Baire space are continuous in the latter case by [48, Prop. 3.7]. Hence,
we may define Ξ3 in the latter case as the functional that lists all finite sequences
of natural numbers on input any (by assumption continuous) functional. 
The functional Ξ is weak in insolation, by the following theorem.
Theorem 4.12. RCAω0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) proves the same L2-sentences as RCA0.
Proof. As in the proof of Corollary 3.15, it suffices to show that [(∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ)]ECF
is provable in RCA0. However, (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) only involves objects of type 0 and 1
except for the two leading quantifiers. Hence, [(∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ)]ECF is as follows:
(∃ξ1 ∈ K0)(∀γ1 ∈ K0)(∀g1)(∃n0)(g ∈
[
ξ(γ)(n)γ(ξ(γ)(n))
]
).
Thus, by defining ξ as the enumeration of γ(w) as in the proof of Theorem 3.14,
we obtain an associate for a functional producing a countable sub-cover, and the
sentence [(∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ)]ECF is therefore provable in RCA0. 
The functional Ξ becomes strong when combined with µ2, as follows.
Theorem 4.13. The Suslin functional S is uniformly computable in Feferman’s µ
and any Ξ satisfying LIN(Ξ). Furthermore, ACAω0 + (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) proves (S2).
Proof. Recall the definition of the Suslin functional S as follows:
S(f) =
{
0 if (∃g1)(∀n0)(f(g¯n) = 0)
1 otherwise
.
Define F 2f (g) as n+1 if n is minimal such that f(g¯n) > 0, and 0 if there is no such
n. Note that Ff is readily defined from f (in terms of µ
2) inside ACAω0 , and note
13The fundamental objects in the language of RCAω0 are functions, with sets being definable
from these, while it is exactly the opposite for RCA0. This however makes no difference.
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that if Ff (h) > 0 and g¯Ff (h) = h¯Ff (h), then Ff (g) = Ff (h). Let Ξ be such that
LIN(Ξ), and consider the following formula
S(f) = 0↔ (∃i0)(Ff (Ξ(Ff )(i)) = 0). (4.2)
The reverse direction in (4.2) is immediate by the definition of Ff . For the forward
direction, assume S(f) = 0 and let g1 satisfy (∀n0)(f(g¯n) = 0), i.e. Ff (g) = 0. As
observed above, if Ff (h) > 0, we have g 6∈ [h¯Ff (h)]; hence if Ff (hn) > 0 for all
n ∈ N where hn = Ξ(Ff )(n), the corresponding countable subset of the covering
induced by Ff will not be a covering. Thus Ff (Ξ(Ff )(n)) = 0 must hold for some
n, i.e. the right-hand side of (4.2) follows. Finally, (4.2) clearly characterises S(f)
in terms of µ, f and Ξ (via a term in Go¨del’s T ), and we are done. 
The reader can readily verify that the proof in the theorem also goes through
using intuitionistic logic. Combining the previous results, we get the following.
Corollary 4.14. RCAω0 + QF-AC
2,1 proves [(S2) + LIND4]↔ [(∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ) + (µ2)].
Corollary 4.15. The superjump S is computable in any Ξ satisfying LIN(Ξ) and
Feferman’s µ, by a term in Go¨del’s T .
Proof. Given such Ξ, there are terms t1, t2 such that SCF(t1(Ξ, µ)) (i.e. Θ is given
by t1(Ξ, µ)), and S =2 t2(Ξ, µ). Checking the details of the proof of Theorem 4.1
and the construction of GF , we see that there is a term t3 such that GF (f) =
t3(F, f, S, µ). Since S(F ) is primitive recursive in Θ(GF ), the theorem follows. 
Finally, the presence of Ξ is not necessary if one is only interested in Π11-CA0. In
particular, the following version of the Lindelo¨f lemma expresses that for a sequence
of open covers of Baire space, there is a sequence of countable sub-covers.
(∀Ψ0→2(·) )(∃f (0×0)→1(·,·) )(∀m0)
[
(∀g1)(∃n0)(g ∈ [fn,mΨm(fn,m)])]. (LINDseq)
Note that such ‘sequential’ theorems are well-studied in RM, starting with [91,
IV.2.12], and can also be found in e.g. [18, 19, 28, 29, 40]. The following corollary
was first published in [71].
Corollary 4.16. The system ACAω0 + LINDseq proves Π
1
1-CA0.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 4.13 goes through with minor modification. Due to
the below ‘grand claims’ based on this corollary, we do provide the proof in some
detail. First of all, by [91, V.1.4], any Σ11-formula can be brought into the ‘normal
form’ (∃g1)(∀n0)(f(gn) = 0), given arithmetical comprehension. Thus, suppose
ϕ(m) ∈ Σ11 has normal form (∃g1)(∀n0)(f(gn,m) = 0) and define F 2m as follows:
Fm(g) is n+ 1 if n is minimal such that f(g¯n,m) > 0, and 0 if there is no such n.
Note that Fm is based on Ff from the theorem. Apply LINDseq for Ψ
2
(·) = F(·) and
let f(·,·) be the sequence thus obtained. We define X ⊂ N as follows:
X := {m0 : (∃n0)(Fm(fn,m) = 0)}, (4.3)
using (µ2). We now prove (∀m0)(m ∈ X ↔ ϕ(m)), establishing the corollary.
If m ∈ X , then there is g1 such that Fm(g) = 0, i.e. (∀n0)(f(gn,m) = 0) by
definition, and hence ϕ(m). Now assume ϕ(m0) for fixed m0, i.e. let g0 be such
that (∀n0)(f(g0n,m0) = 0), and note that for any m0, g1, h1, if Fm(h) > 0 and
g¯Fm(h) = h¯Fm(h), then Fm(g) = Fm(h). In particular, if Fm0(h) > 0, we have
g0 6∈ [h¯Fm0(h)]. Hence, if Fm0(fn,m0) > 0 for all n0, g0 is not in the covering
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consisting of the union of [fn,m0Fm0(fn,m0)] for all n
0, contradicting LINDseq. Thus,
we must have (∃n0)(Fm0 (fn,m0) = 0), implying that m0 ∈ X by (4.3). 
Due to he fact that N×NN is trivially homeomorphic to NN, LINDseq is derivable
from (and hence equivalent to) LIND4, and we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.17. The system ACAω0 + LIND4 proves Π
1
1-CA0.
Remark 4.18 (On predicativist mathematics). We have discussed the compati-
bility problem for Nelson’s predicative arithmetic (and its negative answer) in Sec-
tion 1.2.3. We now argue that Corollary 4.17 also settles the compatibility problem
for Weyl-Feferman predicative mathematics in the negative. To this end, we exhibit
two natural theorems A and B which are both acceptable in predicative mathemat-
ics but A∧B is not. In a nutshell, ATR0 is considered the ‘upper limit’ of predicative
mathematics; both RCAω0 +LIND4 and ACA
ω
0 fall ‘well below’ this upper limit, while
the combination ACAω0 +LIND4 falls ‘well above’ the upper limit. Hence, ACA
ω
0 and
RCAω0 + LIND4 are acceptable in predicative mathematics, but the combination is
not: Π11-CA0 is even the textbook example of an impredicative system ([91, §I.12]).
A detailed discussion (including technicalities) is as follows.
First of all, we elaborate on the notion of ‘acceptable in predicative mathemat-
ics’. On one hand there is Feferman’s notion of predicative provability ([22, 25]),
which is rather limited and clumsy when dealing with ordinary mathematics, ac-
cording to Simpson ([90, p. 154]). On the other hand, the weaker notion of pred-
icative reducibility is more flexible: a formal system T is predicatively reducible if
-intuitively speaking- it is not stronger than a system S which is predicatively prov-
able. Thus, while T may involve impredicative notions, the latter are ‘safe’ from
the point of view of predicative mathematics as these notions only provide as much
strength/power as S, and the latter’s ‘predicative status’ is well-known.
Secondly, Feferman and Schu¨tte have shown (independently) that the least non-
predicatively provable ordinal is Γ0 (See [25, p. 607] for details and references).
Hence, a formal system T is called predicatively reducible if its ordinal |T | satisfies
|T | < Γ0. Note that |ATR0| = Γ0, which motivates the status of ATR0 as the upper
limit of predicative mathematics. Now, the proof-theoretic ordinal of RCAω0 +
LIND4 (resp. ACA
ω
0 ) is ω
ω (resp. ε0) by Theorem 4.12 (resp. [81, Theorem 2.2]) and
[91, IX.5]. Since ωω < ε0 < Γ0, both these systems are predicatively reducible. By
contrast, the combination of these systems, namely ACAω0 + LIND4 implies Π
1
1-CA0
by Corollary 4.17, and the ordinal for the latter system is far beyond Γ0. We refer
to [91, IX.5] for background concerning the cited results and further references.
Finally, we believe there to be many purely logical statements C and D that
are predicatively reducible, while C ∧ D is not. Nonetheless, to the best of our
knowledge, our result as in Corollary 4.17 is unique in that it provides two natural
theorems A and B that are predicatively reducible, while A∧B is not. As a bonus,
the proof of Theorem 4.13 also goes through using only intuitionistic logic. While
LIN4 is quite natural (and implied by Lindelo¨f’s 1903 lemma), the same is not
immediately clear for (∃Ξ)LIN(Ξ), though a case can be made: Ξ is essentially a
realiser for paracompactness (as shown in [83]), and the latter seems to be essential
for proving metrisation theorems, as suggested by the results in [62, Lemma 4.10].
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